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1. Introduction 
At about the same time as productivity growth slowed down in the United 
States, some measures  of the rate of technological change showed  signifi- 
cant strength.  In particular, as documented  in Gordon (1990), the rate of 
technology  growth  embodied  in  new  investment  equipment  and  con- 
sumer  durables  has  been  remarkable.  Gordon's  data imply  an annual 
decrease  in the  price of investment  goods  in terms of nondurable  con- 
sumption  goods  and services of more than 3% on average. A more careful 
inspection  of this relative price series actually also suggests  that the rate of 
technological  change  was  somewhat  higher in the late seventies  and in 
the  eighties  than  before.  Moreover,  using  two-digit  industry  data, 
McHugh and Lane (1987) study vintage capital effects on productivity and 
conclude  that the rate of capital-embodied  technological  change went up 
significantly  around  the  mid-seventies.  Although  the  measurement  of 
technological  change  is inherently  difficult and these findings  should  be 
regarded  only as suggestive,  they do accord with casual observation; for 
example,  the seventies  saw the first emergence  of robotics and microchip 
technologies  in  production  processes.  The purpose  of this  paper  is  to 
investigate  some potentially important implications of rapid technological 
change for the measurement  of the economy's  productivity performance. 
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We focus  on  two  reasons  why  an increase  in the rate of investment- 
specific  technological  improvements  may lead to a decrease  in measured 
productivity  performance:  learning  and  quality  mismeasurements  in- 
duced  by  the  increase  in the  pace  of technological  progress.  First, the 
adoption  of any piece of new capital is associated with learning and initial 
productivity  levels  below  their full potential.  As the rate of technological 
change increases,  relatively more resources are allocated to the new capi- 
tal,  and  average  knowledge  goes  down.  Temporarily, this  produces  a 
slowdown  in measured  productivity  and possibly  also a decrease in the 
output  growth  rate. Examples of this phenomenon  abound; a recent pa- 
per by  Yorukoglu  (1995) emphasizes  these  effects,  and  one  interesting 
case  study  can be  found  in Gjerding  (1991). The kind  of technological 
change  which  we  have  witnessed  during  the  last  decades  can also  be 
argued to represent a change in the way in which capital goods are used in 
production;  there has been  a significant move  toward labor-saving tech- 
niques  (robotization),  and  information  technology  has  inundated  the 
economy.  A large management  literature argues that as a result of these 
technological  developments,  the  internal  organization  of  firms  has 
changed  substantially; the skill requirements on employees  and on man- 
agement  have  changed  in important  ways,  especially  since many  tasks 
have become  computerized.  It seems clear that this kind of organizational 
change  itself is an expression  of learning; it takes time and resources  to 
reorganize  management  and  the  workplace.1  We  formulate  a  simple 
model  of costly  technology  adoption  which  summarizes  all the costs  of 
adoption  in  one  variable,  and  we  make  a qualitative  and  preliminary 
quantitative assessment  of the possible magnitude and timing of a produc- 
tivity  slowdown  resulting  from the  increase  in the  rate of investment- 
specific technological  change  that started in the mid-seventies. 
Second,  there  are  more  general  measurement  problems  associated 
with  the kind of technological  change  recently witnessed  in the United 
States and other industrialized  economies.  In particular, there is a wide- 
spread  perception  that  the  quality  component  of  increases  in  output 
(both  of intermediate  and  final goods)  is important,  and mismeasured 
quality has been discussed  as a potential explanation for the productivity 
slowdown  [see  Baily  and  Gordon  (1988) and  Griliches  (1994) among 
others].  Similarly, quality improvements  have been  particularly empha- 
sized  in  many  of  the  recent  contributions  to  the  endogenous-growth 
literature. In quantitative  terms,  Robert Gordon's work on the measure- 
ment  of durable-goods  prices (Gordon,  1990) is one of the more striking 
1. Lindbeck  and  Snower  (1995)  discuss  this  literature  and  model  the  phenomenon  of 
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examples  of the potential  importance of quality improvements.  He finds 
that the adjustment  for quality increases  the rate of growth  of the quan- 
tity index for equipment  by as much as around 3% annually. 
Gordon's  focus  was  on  durable  goods,  which  admittedly  are prime 
candidates  for goods  with  important  quality improvements,  but many 
other  goods  have  important  quality  components  as well.  In fact, large 
parts  of  the  economy's  final  output  are inherently  poorly  measured, 
such  as most  of the  service  sector. For example,  finance  and insurance 
now produce services well known  to incorporate substantial quality com- 
ponents,  and these  services  are often  directly tied to the advanced  new 
equipment.  Similarly, the retail sector provides  hard-to-measure  conve- 
nience  features  which  to a large extent  are made possible  by the use  of 
new  equipment. 
We  argue  that  the  higher  rate  of  investment-specific  technological 
change  since  the  early  seventies,  and  structural change  toward  new 
kinds  of equipment  more generally,  have  also been  accompanied  by an 
increase  in the quality of output,  and hence  presumably  by an increase 
in mismeasurement  of output.  We should  therefore expect productivity 
accounting  to result in lower measured  performance at around the same 
time  as the  productivity  slowdown.  Moreover,  unlike  for learning,  the 
slowdown  in productivity  due to quality mismeasurement  will persist as 
long  as  the  rate of  technological  progress  and/or  structural change  to- 
ward  quality  does  not reverse  itself.  This indeed  is consistent  with  the 
data: very few countries  have experienced  a full recovery from the slow- 
down,  some  (including  the  United  States) have  had  a partial recovery, 
but  a  majority  have  had  no  recovery.  The  effects  of  quality  mismea- 
surements  are stronger if the quality component  in output has increased 
in relative  terms.  Interestingly,  we  found  some  indirect evidence  from 
patent  data  which  suggests  that  quality  mismeasurements  may  have 
become  more important around the mid-seventies. 
We develop  a simple  model  where  output  has both quality and quan- 
tity components,  and  we  use  this model  to show  how  productivity  ac- 
counting  is affected by different assumptions  on structural change,  and 
on what  is and is not mismeasured.  The exercise  serves  two  purposes. 
First, our stylized  model  environment  makes  conceptually  and qualita- 
tively  clear what  the potential  pitfalls of standard productivity  account- 
ing  procedures  are.  Second,  it  attempts  a  quantitative  assessment  of 
how  much  of the observed  productivity  slowdown  can be attributed to 
the structural change  in investment-specific  technology  growth. 
Our  findings  are suggestive,  but  not  conclusive.  Both learning  and 
quality  mismeasurements  give  rise to slowdowns  that are larger in the 
short run than in the long  run. Taken together,  they  can produce  time- 212 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
series patterns for the slowdown  which are not unlike the data. However, 
the precise  patterns and, in particular, the magnitude  of the slowdowns 
depend  crucially on parameter values we do not know much about, such 
as key parameters in the learning technology  and the relative importance 
of quality. 
Some additional support for our story can be found in a recent paper by 
Greenwood  and  Yorukoglu  (1996),  who  also  study  the  importance  of 
increases in the rate of technological  change for productivity slowdowns. 
Their focus  is wholly  on learning,  and  their model  of learning  is more 
detailed  than  ours.  In particular, the adoption  of new  technologies  is a 
choice  variable for firms, the learning process  is endogenous  (it is mod- 
eled as requiring skilled labor), and the skill formation is endogenous  as 
well. Moreover, their data analysis includes historical studies of the impor- 
tance of new equipment  during the British industrial revolution in the late 
eighteenth  century  and the American  industrial revolution  in the nine- 
teenth  century.2 The historical data are qualitatively  consistent  with  the 
story  told  in their paper  as well  as with  ours: decreases  in the price of 
capital are associated  with productivity  slowdowns. 
Our paper  is organized  in two  parts.  In the first part, Section  2, we 
review  the data and the literature on the productivity  slowdown.  In the 
second  part, Section 3, we conduct  our theoretical exercises.  First in our 
data  section,  we  make  a review  of postwar  productivity  in the  United 
States and elsewhere,  both on an aggregate  and on a sectoral level  (Sec- 
tion  2.1).  In this  context,  we  also  discuss  the  potential  importance  of 
mismeasurement  by  presenting  data on  the  relative importance  of the 
sectors  whose  output  is  particularly  poorly  measured.  Next,  we  go 
through the implications  from adjusting the productivity data using Gor- 
don's price index updates  for durable goods  (Section 2.2). In Section 2.3, 
we  provide  a brief summary  of the candidate  explanations  for the pro- 
ductivity  slowdown  that have been suggested  in the literature. Finally in 
the data section,  we look at some evidence  which  suggests  that the pace 
of  investment-specific  technological  change  has  accelerated  (Section 
2.4).  The baseline  framework  in Section  3 is a simple  two-sector  model 
which  admits  aggregation  across  sectors.  The  aggregation  allows  the 
learning and the quality mismeasurement  hypotheses  to be presented  in 
a very  simple  manner,  and we  simulate  partial models  with  learning or 
with quality mismeasurements  to illustrate both their qualitative proper- 
ties  and  their  potential  for explaining  the  magnitude  of  the  observed 
productivity  slowdown.  We  also  simulate  a  model  calibrated  to  the 
2. Their interpretation  of the recent slowdown  in growth  is more specifically tied to infor- 
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United  States  economy  as  a quantitative  synthesis  of  the  perspective 
suggested  in this  paper.  Finally, we  offer our conclusions  in Section  4. 
2.  The  Productivity  Slowdown:  Data  and 
Preliminary  Assessments 
This  section  contains  a review  of  productivity  statistics  in  the  United 
States and elsewhere,  a very brief summary of the literature on causes of 
the productivity  slowdown,  and a section  with evidence  on a change  in 
the rate of technological  change  specific to equipment  investment.  Our 
data  review  starts  with  a  description  of  the  postwar  development  of 
industry  output  and  productivity  in  the  United  States.  We then  make 
some  international  productivity  comparisons  using  aggregate  data from 
a number  of  developed  economies.  Since  measurement  issues  are the 
focus  of our theoretical analysis,  we  also discuss  the sectoral productiv- 
ity measures  in the United States and in other countries from the point of 
view  of how  well  output  is measured  in the different industries.  Explicit 
and  detailed  adjustments  for quality  improvements  in  durable  goods 
were  made  in  Gordon  (1990), and  we  also  discuss  the  effects  of these 
adjustments  on aggregate  productivity  accounting. 
2.1 A REVIEW  OF AGGREGATE  AND SECTORAL 
PRODUCTIVITY  DATA 
Postwar United  States data on growth  in output  and labor productivity 
are  displayed  in  Table 1 for  the  years  1954-1993.  Industry  output  is 
measured  in  1987 dollars value  added,  and labor input  is measured  by 
the  number  of  full-time-equivalent  employees.3  Labor productivity  is 
output  per unit of labor input.  We consider  three subperiods:  pre-1973, 
1973-1979,  and post-1979. For the whole period aggregate output growth 
was  3.1%; it slowed  down  from 3.7% before  1973 to 2.2% in the  mid- 
seventies  and then recovered partially to 2.6%. Similarly, labor productiv- 
ity  growth  was  1.3% for  the  whole  period;  it was  1.9% before  1973, 
significantly  lower in the mid-seventies  (-0.2%),  but it had a substantial 
recovery  after 1979 to 1.1%. 
Output and productivity  growth rates differ substantially across indus- 
tries during  the time period we  study. Construction  is the industry with 
the lowest  output  growth  (0.9%) and an average annual decline in labor 
productivity  of 0.5%, whereas  the fastest-growing  industry is wholesale 
trade, with an average annual output growth of 4.7% and a labor produc- 
tivity growth  of 2.9%. Although  all industries  are affected by the 1973- 
3. See the Appendix  for data sources. 214 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
Table  1  OUTPUT  AND LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH,  UNITED  STATES  1954-1993 
Growth  rates  (%) 
Output  Labor  productivity 
Sector  54-93  54-73  73-79  79-93  54-93  54-73  73-79  79-93 
Total  private sector  3.1  3.7  2.2  2.6  1.3  1.9  -0.2  1.1 
Agric., forestry,  fishing  1.3  0.2  -0.0  3.6  1.7  1.9  -1.8  3.0 
Mining  1.3  2.5  -3.4  1.8  2.1  3.7  -10.1  5.1 
Construction  0.9  1.6  0.3  0.2  -0.5  -0.6  -1.4  0.0 
Manufacturing  2.7  3.9  1.4  1.6  2.4  2.8  0.6  2.7 
Durables  2.5  3.7  1.0  1.6  2.3  2.4  -0.3  3.2 
Nondurables  2.9  4.2  2.0  1.6  2.6  3.4  1.8  1.9 
Transport.,  publ. util.  3.7  4.5  2.8  3.1  2.9  3.9  1.3  2.3 
Wholesale  trade  4.7  5.2  4.3  4.3  2.9  3.0  1.3  3.3 
Retail trade  3.2  3.6  2.1  3.0  0.7  1.1  -1.2  0.9 
Finance and insur.  3.7  4.7  4.0  2.3  0.8  1.4  0.3  0.2 
Other services  3.9  4.5  3.8  3.1  0.1  0.9  -0.3  -0.8 
1979 slowdown  in output  and labor productivity  growth,  there are some 
differences  across  industries.  First,  some  sectors  have  dramatic  1973- 
1979 slowdowns  (e.g.,  labor productivity  growth  in mining  and agricul- 
ture fell by 13.8 and 3.7 percentage  points,  respectively).  Second,  not all 
industries  recovered from the slowdown  after 1979. Agriculture, mining, 
construction,  durable manufacturing,  transportation and public utilities, 
and trade all rebounded  partially or fully, whereas  nondurable  manufac- 
turing,  finance  and insurance,  and other services  did not.  In particular, 
while  the manufacturing  sector as a whole  has recovered  to its pre-1973 
growth  rates,  the  nondurable  part of  manufacturing  has  not  (and  the 
durable sector has more than recovered). 
It is also interesting  to note that labor productivity growth rates are not 
that much  lower  than output  growth  rates for many sectors (and higher 
for some),  due  to slowly  growing  or declining  employment.  However, 
for the  service  sector industries,  measured  labor productivities  are sub- 
stantially lower,  reflecting considerable  employment  growth. 
Growth  in  total-factor  productivity  (TFP) represents  output  growth 
not accounted  for by the growth  in inputs.  Suppose  industry  i produces 
output  Yi with  inputs  capital ki and labor Ii. If production  has  constant 
returns  to  scale  and  markets  are competitive,  then  the  change  in  TFP 
between  period t and t + 1, which is commonly  referred to as the "Solow 
residual,"  is 
A log  TFPit  =  A log  ,,t -  ai,,  log  kit -  (1  -  ai,t) A log  li,t, Can  Technology  Improvements  Cause  Productivity  Slowdowns?  *  215 
Table  2  TFP  GROWTH,  UNITED  STATES  1954-1993 
Growth  rates  (%) 
Sector  54-93  54-73  73-79  79-93 
Total  private sector  0.8  1.3  -0.6  0.7 
Agric., forestry,  fishing  0.9  -0.1  -2.8  3.8 
Mining  -0.1  1.0  -9.1  2.1 
Construction  -1.1  -1.7  -2.4  0.2 
Manufacturing  1.6  2.1  -0.2  1.6 
Durables  1.5  1.7  -0.9  2.2 
Nondurables  1.7  2.7  0.7  0.9 
Transport.,  publ. util.  2.4  3.2  0.7  2.0 
Wholesale trade  1.6  1.4  0.6  2.3 
Retail  trade  -0.0  0.2  -1.3  0.2 
Finance  and insur.  -1.8  -1.6  -1.3  -2.4 
Other services  -0.6  -0.6  0.1  -0.8 
where  Axt  xt+  -  xt and ai is capital's share of income  in this industry 
(Solow, 1957). Although  this accounting  does not tackle the harder ques- 
tion  of  what  determines  the  growth  in  inputs  and  technology,  it has 
proven  a very valuable organizing  tool for empirical studies  of economic 
growth.4 
Table 2  shows  that  the  development  of  TFP in  the  postwar  United 
States  is  similar  to  that  of  labor productivity.5 Notable  exceptions  are 
finance and insurance and other services: in both these industries  output 
and  labor  productivity  growth  slows  down  in  the  seventies,  but  TFP 
growth improves  in that time period. However,  both these sectors record 
significant  slowdowns  later on.  In sum,  although  capital accumulation 
does  account  for a significant  fraction of output  and labor productivity 
growth,  it does  not help  us understand  the slowdown  in the seventies. 
Turning now  to the  international  economy,  Table 3 shows  data from 
Kendrick (1990). Clearly, the productivity  slowdown  is worldwide.  The 
slowdown  occurs  in  all  of  the  listed  countries,  and  it  is  substantial, 
whether  it is measured  in labor productivity  or TFP growth.  The table 
also  shows  that the  duration  of the  slowdown  differs markedly  across 
countries.  Among  the  19 countries,  11 have  experienced  a slowdown 
which  continues  unabated  throughout  the  sample  period  and  in some 
cases  becomes  significantly  worse  toward  the  end  of the  period  (West 
4. See for example  Jorgenson,  Gollop,  and Fraumeni (1987) and Denison  (1985). 
5. For the TFP growth  calculations  in Table 2 we  disaggregate  industry  capital into equip- 
ment  and  structures.  This  is  useful  given  our  discussion  below  about  the  role  of 
equipment-embodied  technological  change.  The Appendix  describes our procedure and 
the sources  for the capital stock series. 216 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
Table  3  INTERNATIONAL  PRODUCTIVITY  FACTS,  1960-1988 
Growth  rates  in percent 
Labor  productivity  TFP 
Country  60-73  73-79  79-88  60-73  73-79  79-88 
U.S.  2.8  0.6  1.6  1.8  0.1  0.7 
Canada  2.8  1.5  1.5  2.0  0.7  0.3 
Japan  9.4  3.2  3.1  6.4  1.8  1.8 
Austria  5.8  3.3  1.8  3.4  1.4  0.7 
Belgium  5.0  2.8  2.1  3.7  1.5  1.1 
Denmark  4.3  2.6  1.5  2.8  1.2  0.8 
Finland  5.0  3.4  3.2  3.4  1.7  2.3 
France  5.4  3.0  2.4  3.9  1.7  1.5 
Germany  4.6  3.4  1.9  2.7  2.0  0.7 
Greece  8.8  3.4  0.2  5.8  1.5  -0.7 
Italy  6.3  3.0  1.6  4.2  2.2  1.0 
Netherlands  4.9  3.3  1.5  3.1  2.0  0.6 
Norway  4.1  0.1  2.0  3.6  -0.4  1.4 
Spain  6.1  3.8  3.4  4.2  1.7  2.1 
Sweden  3.9  1.4  1.6  2.5  0.3  0.9 
Switzerland  3.2  0.7  0.9  1.6  -0.9  0.2 
U.K.  3.5  1.5  2.6  2.2  0.5  1.9 
Australia  3.2  2.0  1.1  2.9  1.2  1.0 
New Zealand  1.8  -1.5  1.4  1.0  -2.2  0.6 
Germany,  Italy, the  Netherlands,  and  Greece).  For two  countries,  the 
1979-1988  productivity  growth is almost back at its pre-73 level-United 
Kingdom  and New  Zealand-but  in both cases  the pre-73 productivity 
growth  was  dismal  as well.  For the remaining  six countries,  the United 
States included,  productivity  growth  has picked up, but it is far from its 
pre-73 level.  It is thus important to note that although  the United States 
productivity  slowdown  is similar to slowdowns  in some other countries, 
it is among  a minority  showing  partial improvement  in the eighties.6 
2.1.1  Measurement  Issues  Has the productivity  slowdown  of the seven- 
ties been  for real, or does  it reflect systematic  measurement  error? The 
idea  that  mismeasurement  is  potentially  important  for understanding 
productivity  movements  in general  and  the  productivity  slowdown  in 
particular is not at all new.7 Baily and Gordon (1988) discuss  some  mea- 
6. For additional  evidence  on a recovery of TFP growth  in the manufacturing  sector in the 
United  States  see  Gullikson  (1995); for more  on  the  absence  of a recovery  in France, 
Germany, and the United  Kingdom  see Lysko (1995). 
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surement  problems in detail and provide estimates of their importance for 
the productivity  slowdown.  More recently, Griliches (1994) has empha- 
sized  the importance  of poor output  measurement  for the unmeasurable 
sector of the economy,  that is,  industries  for which  output  is inherently 
difficult to measure.  Below we document  that the increase in relative size 
of the unmeasurable  sector has been significant for a large group of coun- 
tries in the postwar period. This phenomenon  affects our ability to gener- 
ate reliable productivity  measures. 
Calculations  of real output  tend  to be  less  reliable when  we  do  not 
have  a well-defined  measure  of  output.  In the  absence  of  such  well- 
defined  measures,  two methods  are usually applied in the United States 
National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  (NIPA). The  first method  ex- 
trapolates  real output  by  use  of  an input  series,  for example  employ- 
ment.8 The  second  method  deflates  a measure  of nominal  output  by a 
corresponding  consumer  price index  (CPI). Given the evidence  that the 
CPI overestimates  the  rate  of  inflation,  as  discussed  in  Shapiro  and 
Wilcox  (1996)  or  in  Boskin  et  al.  (1995),  this  means  that  real  output 
growth  is underestimated.  These problems are especially  relevant when 
there are substantial  changes  in the quality of a sector's output.  A prime 
example  is the service  sector, where  there is reason to believe  that qual- 
ity improvements  have been  substantial.9 
Griliches  (1994) defines  the measurable  sector to include  agriculture, 
mining,  manufacturing,  transportation and communications,  and public 
utilities,  and  the  unmeasurable  sector  to  include  construction,  trade, 
finance,  insurance  and real estate,  other services,  and government.  Al- 
though  there are measurement  problems  in all industries,  we  do think 
this definition  offers a reasonable way of illustrating the growing  impor- 
tance of mismeasurement.10  Table 4 and Figure 1 show  the development 
of TFP in the measurable  and unmeasurable  sectors.  We see  that, as of 
the  end  of the  sample,  the unmeasurable  sector contributes  more than 
50% to United States GDP. The table and the figure also seem to say that 
the  distinction  between  the  measurable  sector  and  the  unmeasurable 
sector is a distinction  between  a "technologically progressive" sector and 
a "technologically  regressive"  sector: the unmeasurable  sector displays  a 
8. In the 1991 revision  of industry  GPO accounts  (see De Leeuw, Mohr, and Parker, 1991), 
this  procedure  has  been  replaced  when  possible  by  more  standard  procedures  like 
double  deflation.  For example,  real output in the transportation industry, which used  to 
be based  on employment  extrapolation,  is now calculated using  double deflation.  There 
are,  however,  important  exceptions  where  real output  continues  to be  calculated  by 
extrapolation; one example  is the banking  sector. 
9. For productivity  analysis  in the service sector see,  e.g.,  Kendrick (1987). 
10. For example,  Baily and  Gordon  (1988) point  to severe  measurement  problems  in the 
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Table  4  TFP  GROWTH  IN THE  MEASURABLE  AND UNMEASURABLE 
SECTORS,  UNITED  STATES  1954-1993 
Growth  rate  (%) 
Sector  54-93  54-73  73-79  79-93 
Total  private sector  0.8  1.3  -0.6  0.7 
Measurable  sector  1.7  2.2  -0.6  2.0 
Unmeasurable  sector  -0.5  -0.4  -0.7  -0.5 
negative  time trend for TFP in the postwar  period,  whereas  the measur- 
able sector displays  a positive  time trend for TFP. For the unmeasurable 
sector,  the  slowdown  of  TFP growth  in  the  seventies  meant  an  even 
faster  decline  of  TFP. In the  period  from  1979 on,  TFP growth  in  the 
measurable  sector has essentially  recovered,  whereas  TFP in the unmea- 
surable sector continues  to decline.  Of course, it is unlikely that the latter 
indeed  does  experience  technological  regress; the  measured  decline  in 
TFP may all be due to underestimated  output growth. 
The unmeasurable  sector represents  an important  component  of the 
economy  in most industrialized  countries.  In Table 5 we report the share 
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Table  5  THE  UNMEASURABLE  SECTORS,  INTERNATIONAL  DATA 
1954-1993 
Share  of GDP 
Country  1954  1973  1979  1993 
U.S.  0.48  0.56  0.58  0.66 
Canada  0.43  0.49  0.50  0.61 
Japan  0.39  0.49  0.54  0.59 
Austria  0.27  0.45  0.48  0.57 
Belgium  0.46  0.49  0.54  0.58 
Denmark  0.30  0.56  0.56  0.56 
Finland  0.29  0.53  0.43  0.48 
France  0.36  0.49  0.51  0.61 
Germany  0.33  0.43  0.45  0.55 
Greece  0.41  0.46  0.49  0.55 
Italy  0.37  0.46  0.46  0.59 
Luxemburg  0.34  0.44  0.55  0.61 
Netherlands  0.39  0.50  0.56  0.62 
Norway  0.36  0.43  0.53  0.43 
Portugal  0.23  -0.45  0.48 
Spain  0.36  -  0.53  0.61 
Sweden  0.46  0.47  0.50  0.58 
Turkey  0.31  0.38  0.36  0.42 
U.K.  0.41  0.47  0.47  0.58 
of the  unmeasurable  sector's  nominal  value  added  in the private busi- 
ness  sector's nominal  GDP for OECD countries during 1954-1993.11 Two 
key facts emerge  from Table 5. First, the size of the unmeasurable  sector 
is  substantial  in  all countries;  by  the  end  of  the  sample  period,  it ac- 
counts  for more than half of total GDP in most countries,  and it accounts 
for significantly  more than half in some.  Second,  the size of the unmea- 
surable  sector  has  increased  substantially  since  1954. This increase  oc- 
curred in all countries,  and it is monotone  for the four dates we report in 
all but a few of the countries. 
The facts described  above are quite important for the interpretation of 
aggregate  productivity  statistics.  First,  they  tell  us  that  measurement 
problems  are important  on  an  aggregate  level,  since  the  part of  GDP 
which  has fundamental  measurement  problems  is so large. Second,  for 
the  postwar  period  the  relative  size  of  the  unmeasurable  sector,  and 
11. The data, which  are calculated  using  OECD's National  Accounts,  Volume II, Detailed 
Tables, and do not include government  in any of the sectors. The beginning  year is 1954 
for all countries  except for Spain,  for which  it is 1958; the end year is 1991 for Canada, 
the United States, Luxemburg, Norway, and Spain, 1990 for Belgium,  1989 for Portugal, 
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therefore  the measurement  problem,  have  increased  substantially.  This 
means  that to the extent  that the recorded productivity  growth  rates in 
the unmeasurable  sector are lower than in the rest of the economy,  these 
compositional  changes  in GDP will  themselves  lead  to a slowdown  in 
aggregate  productivity  growth. 
2.2 QUALITY  IMPROVEMENTS  IN CAPITAL  IN THE  POSTWAR 
PERIOD  AND THEIR  IMPLICATIONS  FOR 
PRODUCTIVITY  ACCOUNTING 
One of the few  examples  of a detailed  and systematic  assessment  of the 
quantitative  importance  of quality improvements  is the work by Gordon 
(1990) on durable goods  prices.  Gordon uses  hedonic  pricing and other 
methods  aimed  at  quantifying  all  the  characteristics  of  new  durable 
goods  for evaluating  their "true" quantity levels.12 The results are strik- 
ing: for durable consumption  goods,  the rate of price increase is adjusted 
downward  and output growth upward,  at an average rate of 1.5 percent- 
age  points  per  year,  and  for producers'  durable  equipment  (PDE) the 
corresponding  number  is 3 percentage  points  per year. The quality ad- 
justments  reflect technological  change  embodied  in new  durable goods, 
so Gordon's  work has unveiled  important developments  in equipment- 
embodied  technological  change.  In this  section  we  study  the  implica- 
tions  of  Gordon's  quality  adjustments  for  the  measurement  of  TFP 
growth. 
2.2.1  Revising the Productivity Accounts  Gordon's  revision  of  the  dur- 
able-goods  price  series  has  implications  for the  measurement  of  TFP, 
because  it affects our measures  of durable-goods  industries'  outputs  and 
capital inputs  used  in all industries.  First, a higher growth rate of output 
from durable-goods  manufacturing increases labor-productivity and TFP 
growth  in that industry.  Second,  investment  in PDE adds to the stock of 
capital  in  all industries,  so  the  upward  revision  of the  growth  rate of 
investment  increases  the growth  rate of the capital stock. This, in turn, 
leads to a downward  adjustment  in TFP growth in all industries.13 
In Table 6 we  report the effects on measured  TFP growth  of adjusting 
output  in  the  durable-goods  manufacturing  sector  and  the  equipment 
stocks in all sectors.  For simplicity we have assumed  the quality mismea- 
12. Except for the case of computers,  which are part of the Office Computing  and Account- 
ing  Machinery  (OCAM)  category,  such  methods  are not  used  for the  official income 
statistics. 
13. In principle,  durable consumption  goods  represent investment  which raises the level of 
household  capital. Although  there are good arguments  for including  household  capital 
and  household  production  into  national  income  accounts,  we  follow  standard proce- 
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Table  6  TFP  GROWTH,  UNITED  STATES  1954-1993  BASED  ON GORDON'S 
PRICE  ADJUSTMENTS 
Growth  rates  (%) 
Sector  54-93  54-73  73-79  79-93 
Total  private sector  0.7  1.3  -0.5  0.6 
Agric., forestry,  fishing  0.5  -0.5  -3.2  3.4 
Mining  -0.7  0.4  -9.7  1.6 
Construction  -1.3  -1.8  -2.6  0.1 
Manufacturing  2.5  3.2  1.1  2.3 
Durables  3.5  4.1  1.7  3.5 
Nondurables  1.4  2.4  0.4  0.6 
Transport.,  publ. util.  2.0  2.8  0.3  1.7 
Wholesale trade  1.3  1.1  0.3  2.1 
Retail  trade  -0.3  -0.0  -1.5  -0.1 
Finance  and insur.  -2.3  -2.1  -1.7  -2.8 
Other services  -1.0  -1.1  -0.3  -1.2 
Measurable  sector  2.1  2.5  0.1  2.3 
Unmeasurable  sector  -0.8  -0.7  -1.0  -0.8 
surement for PDE is the same in all sectors, and we have adjusted sectoral 
PDE investment  and  stocks using  Gordon's  price series.  Unfortunately, 
Gordon's  equipment  price index is available only until 1983; for the years 
following  1983 we have used an official price index for the subcategory of 
equipment  where  quality is appropriately accounted  for and have made 
an ad hoc,  but conservative,  adjustment  for the other subcategories-a 
1.5-percentage-point  reduction  in the annual  growth  rate of the official 
price indexes.14 
In comparison  with  the  unadjusted  numbers  in Table 2, we  see  that 
the expected  changes  occur: the TFP growth rates decrease for all sectors 
except  durable-goods  manufacturing,  by about 0.3-0.4  percentage  point 
on  average,  and  the  rate increases  for the  durable-goods  sector  by  2 
percentage  points.  The  adjustments  are larger the  larger is the  equip- 
ment  share,  so the adjustments  in mining,  which  has the highest  capital 
share,  are the largest outside  durable manufacturing.  However,  the ad- 
justments  here  have  no  new  implications  for the  period  of  the  slow- 
down:  the  adjustments  are quite uniform  over  the whole  period.  Also 
note  that  we  have  plotted  the  adjusted  series  for the  measurable  and 
14. This  procedure  was  suggested  to  us  by  Robert Gordon.  More  elaborate  procedures 
based  on estimating  the patterns  of adjustments  made by Gordon and forecasting  the 
quality adjustments  after 1983 have been tried elsewhere  (see Krusell, et al.,  1995) and 
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unmeasurable  aggregates  in Figure 1. The adjustments  increase  overall 
TFP growth  in the  measurable  sector and decrease  it in the unmeasur- 
able sector (durable manufacturing  is regarded as measurable). 
2.2.2  A  Consumption-Investment Breakdown  of Productivity Improvements 
Investment-specific  technological  change,  that is, technological improve- 
ments  in the sectors producing  investment  goods,  is different in nature 
from that in other  sectors.  Unlike technological  improvements  in other 
sectors,  investment-specific  technological  change will increase labor pro- 
ductivity  and  output  growth  in  all sectors,  since  capital is used  as  an 
input  in  all sectors.  For this  reason,  it is  instructive  to take a slightly 
different  perspective  on  productivity  accounting  than the one  adopted 
above. 
Suppose  we  think  of the  economy  as consisting  of two  sectors,  one 
producing  consumption  goods  c and one producing  investment  goods  i. 
Each good  is produced  using  capital and labor as inputs: 
Ct  =  c,  tfc(kc  tlc,t), 
it 
= 
i,  tfi(ki, t lit). 
Let kt and  It be  the  economy  wide  endowments  of capital and labor at 
time  t, and  suppose  that inputs  are freely mobile between  sectors.  Fur- 
thermore  assume  that production  has constant returns to scale and that 
isoquants  have  the  same  shape  in the two  sectors,  i.e.,  that f  c = fi. 
Then perfect competition  in all markets implies that total output in terms 
of consumption  goods  can be written as follows: 
t +  -  t =  y,tf(kt,lt). 
yi,t 
The  reciprocal  of  the  ratio  q  y,yi/y represents  the  relative  price  of 
investment  goods.  We identify  the  investment-specific  component  of 
productivity  with  the  ratio q. Alternatively,  this  ratio could  be  called 
capital-embodied  productivity,  since,  relative  to  consumption,  the 
growth  rate of q will  equal  the  rate at which  capital goods  production 
becomes  more efficient  over time.15 Similarly, we  may denote  by z =y 
the sector-neutral  productivity. 
Measuring  total output in units of consumption  goods  and identifying 
output  with  an  aggregate  production  function  means  that  aggregate 
15. To see this,  define  investment  in consumption  units f and note that the amount  of new 
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productivity  should  be interpreted  as the economy's  ability to produce 
consumption  goods,  given  values  for total inputs.  Similarly, we  can de- 
fine  output  in terms  of investment  goods,  and measure  the economy's 
ability to produce  investment  goods  for given total inputs.  This amounts 
to multiplying  the  above  constraint  with  yi/y,  which  yields  an output 
definition  which  is  associated  with  the  productivity  level  y,. In other 
words,  "aggregate  productivity"  defined  this way  really is sectoral pro- 
ductivity,  and  the  aggregate  productive  ability of  the  economy  is best 
described  by  a vector  (y,, yc). Thus,  the additional  theoretical assump- 
tions allow us to recover the sector-specific productivity parameters with- 
out the knowledge  of sector-specific  input levels. 
Equipped  with  a  standard  capital accumulation  equation  and  some 
specification  of savings  behavior, we now have a version of the standard 
neoclassical  growth  model  which  allows  for investment-specific  techno- 
logical change.  As such,  this framework is well  suited  for analyzing  the 
relative importance  of investment-specific  technological  change for long- 
run  output  growth.  Such  an  analysis  is  performed  in  Greenwood, 
Hercowitz,  and Krusell (1995), and it proceeds  in two steps. 
First, the growth  rate of q is identified  with  the rate of decline  of the 
relative  price of capital goods,  as given  by Gordon's  price deflator for 
PDE divided  by  the  price  deflator  for nondurable  consumption  goods 
and services.16 The updated  version  of this series is plotted  in Figure 2. 
According  to  Figure  2,  the  relative  price  of  PDE  declines  (that  is, 
investment-specific  technological  knowledge  increases) at an annual rate 
of  about  3%. Also,  it  appears  that  the  rate of  price  decline  is  larger 
towards  the end  of the  sample,  and that the change  in trend occurs in 
the mid-seventies.  We will get back to this issue  shortly. 
Second,  the growth rate of this ratio over the sample is used to calculate 
how  the long-run  growth  rate which  follows  from the balanced-growth 
path of the model  depends  on the two kinds of investment-specific  and 
neutral technological  change,  respectively.  Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and 
Krusell (1995) find that the former accounts for around 60% of total con- 
sumption  growth,  which  is what is of importance to consumers  living in 
this kind of economy.  As part of the procedure,  a series for the neutral 
technological  change  z is obtained.  The series is displayed  in Figure 3. 
This  graph  shows  a  drastic  version  of  the  productivity  slowdown: 
neutral productivity  increases until the mid-seventies,  after which it falls 
uninterruptedly  until  the  very  end  of  the  sample,  when  it  increases 
again.  There are two reasons  for the drastic productivity  slowdown/fall. 
The first reason  is the increase in the rate of growth  of the capital stock 
16. That analysis  also distinguishes  between  investment  in PDE and in structures. 224 *  HORNSTEIN & KRUSELL 
Figure 2 PRICE OF PDE RELATIVE  TO NONDURABLE CONSUMPTION 
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implied  by  Gordon's  revisions  of the  relative  efficiency  of new  invest- 
ment.  Second,  we  measure  the  economy's  current  ability  to  produce 
nondurable  consumption  goods  and  services,  but these  goods  are to a 
large extent  supplied  by the unmeasurable  sector. We have  seen  above 
that TFP in that sector actually declined  in the postwar period,  and thus 
our  result  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  sectoral revisions  above.  To 
evaluate  the  economy's  ability  to  transform  current consumption  into 
future consumption,  the growth  of q becomes  relevant.17 
This paper examines  possible  implications  of investment-specific  tech- 
nological  change  for productivity  accounting.  In particular, we use theo- 
retical model  economies  to examine whether  this phenomenon,  together 
with learning about new technologies  and mismeasurement  of the quality 
improvements  in new  goods,  can help us understand  the recorded pro- 
ductivity  slowdown.  Before we  proceed  to that analysis,  however,  we 
have  two  more topics  to cover. As a background,  we will first provide  a 
brief review  of explanations  for the productivity  slowdown.  Second,  we 
take another  look  at technological  change  occurring in the investment- 
goods  sector  and  provide  some  additional  evidence  that  the  rate  of 
investment-specific  technological  change has increased sometime  during 
the mid-seventies. 
2.3 EXPLANATIONS  FOR  THE  SLOWDOWN:  A BRIEF 
LITERATURE  REVIEW 
A variety of explanations  have been proposed  to account for the produc- 
tivity  slowdown.  At  this  point  we  provide  a brief review  of the  more 
popular  ones.  We would  like to suggest  that while  these  explanations 
account  for some  of the  observed  slowdown  in TFP growth,  the larger 
part of  the  slowdown  remains  unexplained.  The  review  will  be  quite 
brief and  sketchy.  For a more  comprehensive  treatment  the  interested 
reader may consult any one of the many excellent survey papers, summa- 
ries, and conferences  volumes  on the subject.18 
A reasonably  comprehensive  list of potential  explanatory factors is as 
follows.  We exclude  the  "measurement  explanation"  here,  since  it has 
already been  discussed  and will be elaborated on in later sections. 
Decreases in labor quality. In the  productivity  calculations  above,  no  ad- 
justments  are made  for changes  in labor quality. Many authors  have 
17. Note also that the ability  to produce durable  consumption  goods is not directly  given 
by the graph, but needs to be adjusted  by the relative  price  increase  for nondurables  in 
terms of durables. 
18. See, for example, Cullison (1989),  the 1988:2(4)  issue of the Journal  of Economic  Perspec- 
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used  educational  attainments,  possibly  corrected for the quality of the 
educational  achievements  (e.g.,  as measured  by SAT test scores),  and 
other  aspects  of changes  in the  heterogeneity  of the  labor force (the 
age-race-sex  distribution)  to  revise  the  labor  input.  The  difficulty 
with  this explanation  is that no substantial changes  in the labor input 
can be detected  at the time the slowdown  began.  In addition,  many of 
the changes  in the quality of the labor force are specific to the United 
States and therefore do not explain the international slowdown.  Views 
on the importance  of this explanation,  however,  differ.19 
The oil shock(s). To many,  the  most  attractive explanation  for the  slow- 
down  is  the  oil  shock,  because  the  timing  is right and  because  it is 
common  to all countries.20 There are problems  with  this explanation. 
Taking into  account  the  cost  share  of energy,  and  the  modest  slow- 
down  that occurred in actual energy  input,  only a very small fraction 
of the slowdown  can be accounted  for. Indirect effects through capital 
obsolescence  are also problematic: given  the small energy  cost share, 
the  massive  move  to  alternative  kinds  of  capital  which  would  be 
needed  to  motivate  the  large  slowdown  seems  to  contradict  profit 
maximization.  In addition,  we have not observed  the changes  in used- 
capital  prices  that  would  follow  from the  obsolescence  explanation. 
Furthermore,  following  the reduction  in real oil prices in the eighties 
we have not observed  an increase in TFP growth rates which is compa- 
rable in magnitude  to the slowdown  in the seventies.  All the same, the 
timing  of  this  explanation  is  "too good  to be  a coincidence"  in  the 
views  of many, and other indirect, but not spelled-out  effects,  such as 
macroeconomic  disruptions,  have been mentioned.21 
A  slowdown in  R&D and the number of technological  innovations. In  the 
United  States,  the  R&D share  of  total expenditures  declined  in  the 
mid-sixties,  and  the  number  of patents  per R&D dollar has  also  de- 
clined.  However,  the  decline  in  R&D expenditure  is  specific  to  the 
United  States,  and R&D expenditures  have increased  again without  a 
concomitant  increase  in productivity. Moreover, the R&D explanation 
is tailored to the manufacturing  industry, and does little to address the 
decline  in service-sector  productivity.  Did the number of new  innova- 
tions  go down,  and are we  experiencing  diminishing  returns to R&D 
and "technological  exhaustion"?  First, in the United States the decline 
19. For references,  see  Denison  (1985),  Darby  (1984),  Baily  (1981a),  Baily and  Gordon 
(1988), Jorgenson et al. (1987), and Dean,  Kunze,  and Rosenblum  (1988). 
20. Baily and  Gordon  (1988) do  provide  an  argument  why  the  timing  is  not  perfect: a 
slowdown  had already begun  in several sectors before the oil shock. 
21. For references,  see  Nordhaus  (1982), Summers  (1982), Baily (1981b), Jorgenson  et al. 
(1987), Bruno (1981), Bruno and Sachs (1982), Hulten,  Robertson,  and Wykoff (1989), 
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in the number of granted patents can be explained by budget cuts and 
a  decline  in  resources  allocated  to  patent  granting.  Second,  in  our 
view,  it seems  difficult to argue  that the last two  decades  have  been 
characterized  by  particularly slow  technological  change,  considering 
the  rapid  expansion  in  information  technology  and  other  high- 
technology  areas.22 
Regulations, cultural change, labor  disputes, management  failures. It has been 
argued that the increase in the number and strictness of regulations  in 
the  United  States  during  the  second  half of the postwar  period  may 
have  played  an  important  role  in  lowering  productivity.  Similarly, 
there have been increases  in crime rates and labor-market disruptions 
which  have  the potential  to lower  productivity. Management  failures 
which  could  also be reflected  in a decrease  of measured  productivity 
have also been stressed.  Although  there are merits to all these explana- 
tions,  they  have  the  usual  problems:  there is no perceived  sharp in- 
crease in any one  of these  factors in the mid-seventies,  and although 
some  of  these  problems  did  occur in  some  other countries,  none  of 
them is worldwide.23 
The coincidence  of a number  of sector-specific  problems. One  approach  is to 
analyze  what  might  have  caused  the  slowdown  sector by sector. For 
example,  it has been  argued that the slowdown  in construction is due 
to unionization,  as well  as to specific problems with output deflation. 
Mining  has  had  problems  because  marginal costs  of extraction have 
risen  rapidly, especially  during  the time the oil price and production 
increased.  The electric utility industry  is characterized by large fixed 
costs  and  very  low  marginal costs,  so when  demand  decreases,  as it 
did after the oil shocks,  measured  productivity  falls substantially. Al- 
though  some  of the sector-specific  explanations  have common  causes, 
such  as  the  oil  shocks,  a  more  complete  analysis  of  all  sectors  is 
unlikely  to  satisfy  the  timing  requirement  and  to be  valid  for other 
countries.24 
In conclusion,  views  differ widely  on the  quantitative  importance  of 
the different explanations  for the slowdown.  Denison  (1985) can account 
22. For  surveys  and  case  studies  on  R&D,  see  Griliches  (1988,  1994)  and  Baily  and 
Chakrabarti (1988). For the technology  exhaustion  hypothesis,  see  Baumol and Wolff 
(1979), and Nordhaus  (1982). 
23. For references  on  the  effects  of regulations,  see  Denison  (1985), Norsworthy,  Harper, 
and  Kunze  (1979),  and  Christiansen  and  Haveman  (1981). For cultural aspects,  see 
Denison  (1985), and Naples  (1988). For labor-market disruptions,  see Denison  (1985), 
Gordon  (1981), and Naples  (1981), and for management  failures see Hayes  and Aber- 
nathy  (1980), Dertouzos,  Lester, and Solow  (1990), and Summers  (1982). 
24. For references,  see Baily and Gordon (1988), Allen (1985), and Thurow (1987). 228 * HORNSTEIN & KRUSELL 
for about one-third  of the slowdown  in the seventies  with a subset of the 
explanations  listed above.  Others claim greater success,  but it seems  fair 
to say that not more than half of the slowdown  has been accounted  for. 
2.4  EVIDENCE ON STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
We propose  an alternative explanation of the productivity slowdown:  we 
suggest  that the measured  decline in productivity  growth can in part be 
attributed to an increase  in the rate of investment-specific  technological 
change.  In this section we present evidence  for an increase in the rate of 
investment-specific  technological  change  during  the  seventies.  In the 
next sections,  we will then discuss  why an increase in the rate of techno- 
logical change  may lead to a decrease in measured  productivity  growth. 
Because  technologies  are available worldwide,  our explanation  can ac- 
count for the simultaneous  decline in productivity growth among indus- 
trialized countries. 
The task of quantifying  the rate of technological  change,  not to men- 
tion  detecting  a  long-term  change  in  this  rate,  is  difficult.  There  is 
ample  anecdotal  evidence  on  important  technological  improvements, 
most  of  them  capital-embodied,  which  have  occurred  during  the  last 
decades.  Many  of  these  improvements  have  been  associated  with  the 
introduction  of microprocessors  and computers into the production  pro- 
cess.  Computers  have  made  possible  new  organizational  structures, 
and they  have  been  incorporated  into other capital goods.  In manufac- 
turing,  numerically  controlled  machine  tools,  robotization,  and  auto- 
matic  assembly  have  been  introduced  in  many  production  processes 
[see  Edquist  and  Jacobsson  (1988) for a discussion].  Faster and  more 
efficient  means  of  telecommunication  and  transportation  have  also 
been  developed.  It is of  course  difficult  to date  any  of these  develop- 
ments  precisely,  but  many  of  them  did  appear  in  the  seventies.  Of 
course,  the  critical reader  should  then  note  that the  fifties  and  sixties 
also  saw  many  advances  in  the  production  of  consumer  electronics, 
cars,  and  so  on.  Although  most  of  the  anecdotal  evidence  which  we 
have  encountered  for the  earlier period  is less  equipment-related  than 
for the  period  of the  slowdown  and  thus  not really contradictory with 
our thesis,  it is clear that we  need  to go beyond  speculation  about an 
increase  in  the  rate  of  capital-embodied  technological  change  based 
purely  on  anecdotes.  Therefore,  we  investigate  two  measures  of  the 
aggregate  rate of investment-specific  technological  change.  These  mea- 
sures  are based  on  different  kinds  of  data,  and  thus  complementary. 
They  do  speak  in  favor  of  a  structural  break  in  the  growth  rate  of 
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2.4.1  Use  of  the  Relative-Price Data  Hulten  (1992)  and  Greenwood, 
Hercowitz,  and  Krusell  (1995)  identify  the  growth  rate  of  capital- 
embodied  technological  change  with  the  rate of decline  in the  relative 
price of investment  goods.  Their procedure,  as outlined  in Section 2.2.2, 
relies on assumptions  similar to those in Solow  (1957). The relative price 
of PDE based  on Gordon's  price series is displayed  in Figure 2. Inspec- 
tion of this figure suggests  that starting in the mid-seventies  the relative 
price of new  capital declined  at a higher rate, about one percentage point 
more  on  an  annual  basis.  This  would  indicate  an  accelerated  rate  of 
capital-embodied  technological  change.  Before we  test  for a structural 
break in the relative-price  series,  we  want  to discuss  in more detail the 
identification  of the relative price of capital with  capital-embodied  tech- 
nological  change. 
A change  in a relative price can reflect a change  in relative productiv- 
ity, or it may  simply  reflect substitution  in production.  The analysis  in 
Section  2.2.2  shows  that the relative price of investment  goods  reflects 
the  relative  productivity  of the  investment  sector only  if production  is 
competitive,  inputs  are  mobile  across  sectors,  and  the  production 
isoquants  are the  same  in the investment-  and the consumption-goods 
sector. In terms of a Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  the last condi- 
tion  means  that the  capital and labor income-share  parameters have  to 
be  the  same.  As  we  have  pointed  out  earlier,  income  shares  differ 
across  sectors;  in  particular,  the  sector  producing  durable  goods  has 
one  of  the  lowest  capital  income  shares.  Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and 
Krusell  (1995) show  that on  the  balanced-growth  path  the behavior  of 
the relative  price of investment  goods  depends  crucially on the relative 
income  shares  in  the  consumption-  and  investment-goods  sectors.  In 
particular, if the  capital income  share is lower  in the investment  sector 
and  there  is  no  investment-specific  technological  change,  we  should 
observe  an increase  in the relative price of investment  goods.  Since we 
observe  the  opposite,  the  decline  in  the  relative  price  of  investment 
goods  must underestimate the growth rate of investment-specific  techno- 
logical  change.  More to the  point,  to the  extent  that income  shares  in 
the two  sectors  are different  and trend differently  over time,  any infer- 
ence  about  the  rate  of  technological  change  which  assumes  constant 
and equal shares will be misleading. 
To be more concrete,  assume  that production  in the investment-  and 
consumption-goods  sector is Cobb-Douglas, 
-  lkac,tll-ac,t  Ct  "  t"'c,t "c,t 
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and that income  shares are not constant.  Assume  perfect competition  in 
production,  and let Pt  denote  the relative price of capital. It is easy to show 
that the relative productivity of the investment-goods  sector qt  satisfies the 
following  relationship  when  inputs  are freely mobile across sectors: 
1  C  ktijll-  ai,t 
Ct  ,t  "i,  t 
qt  it  k  1ac't-a"ct 
'  ' 'c,t -c,t 
where  kt = kc, + ki, and I = lt  + li,t  and 
It 
ptit  1 - 
ai,t  1+  = 
Ct 1  -  ac,t 
and 
kt 
kt =  ct  1 
-7ac,t ai,t  i,t  1+ 
1 -  ti,t  aC,t  Ic,t 
Using  data on  aggregate  quantities  {kt, lt, ct, it}, prices  {Pt},  and  income 
shares {atc,,  at},  we  can use  these  equations  to construct a series for the 
relative  productivity  of the  investment  sector, qt. In particular, we  use 
time-series  data on  the capital income  share to isolate  the effect of any 
trend change in this variable on the relative price.25  In the postwar United 
States the capital income share in the durable-goods  manufacturing sector 
has declined relative to the share in other sectors. Following our argument 
above,  everything  else equal this should lead to an increase  in the relative 
price of equipment.  Hence,  our adjustment  procedure will imply an in- 
creasing  trend  in  the  rate of investment-specific  technological  change. 
The  reciprocal  of  the  relative  price Pt and  our measure  of investment- 
specific technological  change  qt  are graphed  in Figure 4. 
The price of PDE relative to the price of nondurable consumption  and 
services declined  over the postwar period, and the rate of this decline in- 
creased in the mid-seventies.  A simple regression of the relative price of 
PDE on a time trend and a change in trend in 1973 shows  that there was a 
25. In the actual  implementation,  we have used a slightly  more  elaborate  setup which uses 
both equipment and structures,  and the investment sector thus represents  the sector 
producing equipment. For a more detailed description  of the data and the procedure 
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Figure  4 INVESTMENT-SPECIFIC  TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE 
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statistically significant increase in the rate of decline from 2.9% before 1973 
to 3.6% after 1973; see column 1 of Table 7. In the second column of Table 7 
we present the results from a regression of the derived inverse relative pro- 
ductivity series on a linear time trend with a change in trend in 1973. The 
derived inverse  relative productivity series exhibits an even faster rate of 
decline,  and the rate of decline increases from 3.2% before 1973 to 4% after 
1973. The change in the rate of decline is highly significant. 
Finally, we  should  comment  on the assumption  that prices are given 
by marginal productivities.  If markups are variable, changes  in relative 
prices  need  not  reflect relative  productivity  change.  It is thus  possible 
that the decrease  in the rate of decline of the relative price of equipment 
reflects a decline  in markups.  This is consistent  with the notion  that we 
have seen  an increase in international competition  for at least a subset of 
the economy's  products.  However,  note that for this alternative explana- 
tion  of  the  structural change  in  the  relative-price  time  series,  two  ele- 
ments  are necessary.  First, it is necessary  that the  decline  in markups 
have the right time-series  pattern. In particular, to explain the change in 
the  trend  of  the  relative  price  around  the  mid-seventies,  the  markup 
would  need  to have  started to fall around  the same time,  and it would 
need  to have continued to fall throughout  the rest of the period (actually, 
the fall in the relative price even  seems  to accelerate toward the end  of 232 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
Table  7  STRUCTURAL  CHANGE 
Dependent  variable  log Pt  log (llqt) 
Constant  0.0415  0.0569 
(0.0204)a  (0.0169)a 
Trend  -0.0289  -0.0322 
(0.0014)b  (0.0012)b 
Trend change  for t -  1973  -0.0058  -0.0085 
(0.0026)a  (0.0021)b 
asignificant  at the 5%  level. 
bsignificant at the 1% level. 
the period).  Second,  it is necessary  for the  decline  in markups  to have 
been  larger  for  equipment  goods  than  for  consumption  goods,  since 
otherwise  there would  be no change  in the relative  price which  we focus 
on. Although  we do not suggest  to rule out the declining-markup  expla- 
nation,  we  do not know  of any evidence  supporting  the necessary  ele- 
ments  for this explanation. 
2.4.2  Other Evidence  on Capital-Embodied  Technological  Change  The litera- 
ture  on  vintage-specific  productivity  effects  can  also  be  used  to  shed 
light  on  the  rate  of  capital-embodied  technological  progress.  In  fact, 
McHugh  and Lane (1987) looked  at precisely the issue  we are interested 
in. They study  the effect of the age of capital on labor productivity  using 
data from two-digit  manufacturing  industries in the United States. Using 
a framework  which  builds  on Solow  (1959), they conclude  that (1) labor 
productivity  declines  significantly  with  increasing  age  of  the  capital 
stock,  and  (2) the  negative  effect  of  the  age  of  capital is  significantly 
stronger  for capital installed  after 1974. That is, a one-year  difference  in 
capital vintage  corresponds  to a larger productivity difference if the capi- 
tal was installed  after 1974. McHugh and Lane hence conclude  that there 
was  an increase  in the technological  advancement  embodied  in capital. 
The results  of McHugh  and Lane are derived  from a model  structure 
and  a  concept  of  technological  change  quite  like  ours,  and  they  are 
consistent  with  our findings.  Their results provide  additional,  indepen- 
dent evidence  for our hypothesis  of an increase in the rate of investment- 
specific technological  change  sometime  in the mid-seventies. 
3.  Theoretical  Framework  and  Analysis 
The increase in the rate of investment-specific  technological  change  can 
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of technological  change means that new technologies  with which produc- 
ers have  less  experience  are introduced  at a faster rate. This can lead to 
temporarily lower  output  growth.  Moreover, it causes problems for pro- 
ductivity  measurement,  since  experience  is unobserved.  Faster techno- 
logical  change  can  also  mean  that  new  kinds  of  goods  which  differ 
substantially  in their characteristics from existing  goods  are introduced 
at a faster rate.  This makes  the  measurement  of output  more  difficult. 
There is a substantial  body  of research which  shows  that learning,  in 
particular learning by doing,  has important effects on productivity. Over 
time  individuals  learn  how  to  perform  certain  tasks,  production  sites 
become  more  efficient,  and  productivity  increases.  Learning  curves 
which  relate productivity  to  some  measure  of accumulated  experience 
have been estimated for a large number of applications: well-known  exam- 
ples in economics  include Rapping (1965) on shipyards and Alchian (1963) 
on airframe production.26 While there is agreement on the fact that there is 
learning,  there are few explicit models  of the learning technology  itself.27 
In our work we will simply assume  that learning about new technologies 
is necessary  and that it is exogenous.  We will study the quantitative impli- 
cations of learning for the measurement  of productivity  growth in a sim- 
ple vintage  model  of growth. 
In previous  sections  we  have argued that for a large part of the econ- 
omy measures  of output are not reliable. We will develop  a simple model 
in which  we can discuss  the problem of mismeasured  output and how  it 
relates  to an accelerated  pace  of technological  change.  Again,  the pur- 
pose  is  to  quantify  the  implications  for the  slowdown  of productivity 
growth  in a simple  vintage  model.  In a final section,  we  bring the two 
explanations  of the productivity  slowdown  together,  and we  use  actual 
United States input and relative price series for a quantitative evaluation. 
3.1 SLOWDOWNS  DUE TO LEARNING 
We now  turn  to  productivity  measurement  in  a growth  model  when 
there is learning  about  new  plants  or new  capital goods.  Suppose  that 
any  investment  in  period  t is incorporated  into  a "vintage  t" plant.  In 
other  words,  we  do  not  consider  "retooling."  In  each  existing  plant 
learning  proceeds  at an exogenous  rate. The production  function  with 
learning  thus reads 
y  =  yTkll-a, 
26. For a survey  on learning by doing  in the management  literature see Yelle (1979). 
27. Recently  Jovanovic  and  Nyarko  (1995) have  interpreted  estimated  learning  curves 
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where  T represents  what  has  been  learned  about  the  plant,  and  T is 
increasing  with time. It is possible  to think of the structure in this section 
as the consumption-investment  two-sector model of Section 2.2.2 with y 
here representing  sector-neutral  technology  (y,), and so on. 
3.1.1  A Vintage Model with Aggregation  At time t, total investment  is it, 
and  it is  all put  into  a new  plant  (or many  smaller  plants).  With  the 
assumption  that each unit of capital depreciates  at rate 8 per period,  the 
output  at time  t of a plant which  was  set up with  investment  in t -  ', 
which  we  label Yt,, is 
Yt,r  y tTt,  [i  t-t(  -  8)r-1]  l  a 
for all t and all r  > 1, where  Tt, is the experience  level and  t,, the amount 
of labor used  at this plant. Total production  of goods  is 
Yt  =  Yt,t 
T =1 
When  labor can be  allocated  freely  across  vintages  at any  moment  in 
time,  optimal  allocations  satisfy 
It,  =  lt,lrt,/ 
where 
it-Tr  Tt 
This  condition  follows  from  equalizing  the  marginal  product  of  labor 
across plants. The vector (1, r,2, rt3,  .  .  .) thus describes the relative alloca- 
tion  of  labor across  vintages  and,  in particular, across  learning  levels. 
Using  the resource constraint for labor, it is straightforward to show  that 
it 
It,1  -  I 
ZT=  lrr,,r 
where  lt is the total amount of labor input at time t. Similarly, total output 
at time t satisfies 
Yt  =  y  tktl-a  */(  7^t  t  '1 Can  Technology  Improvements  Cause  Productivity  Slowdowns?  *  235 
where 
00 
kt=  itl-y(1  -1ltT 
T7=1 
Hence,  this economy  admits sectoral aggregation: there exists an aggre- 
gate capital measure  kt, defined  as above,  such that output  at any point 
in time is given  by a function  of this capital measure,  total labor input, 
and the productivity  parameter alone. 
It is clear from the above  that if there were  accurate measures  of the 
learning parameters Tt,,,  aggregate  growth accounting  would  proceed as 
in the previous  section,  replacing the total capital stock kt  with kt, and the 
TFP growth  rate would  be 
A log zt =  A log Yt  -  a A log kt -  (1 -  a) A log lt. 
This procedure  would  indeed  lead to accurate measurement  of technol- 
ogy  change:  A log zt =  A log yt. Instead,  however,  we  assume  here that 
capital is measured  as in the national accounts,  which  do not adjust for 
learning levels.  Thus,  the measured  capital, kt, is calculated using  kt+  = 
(1 -  S)kt  + it, so that 
kt  =  it.(1 
- 
8  1, 
T=1 
and growth  accounting  results in measured  TFP growth 
log zt =  A log yt -  aA log kt -  (1 -  a) A log It. 
For this analysis,  we  assume  that output  and labor input  are well  mea- 
sured.  Given that learning levels  are not well measured,  however,  there 
is no reason  to expect  that A log zt  =  A log zt in general.  On a balanced 
growth  path,  however,  the  growth  rate  of  productivity  is  accurately 
measured.  Specifically, suppose  that yt =  yt and that investment-specific 
technological  change  is given by yqt 
=  y'  so that output in consumption 
units  grows  at  y1/(1-a)^ya0(l-a)  and  investment  and  capital  at  (yyq)l/'-a).  It is 
easy  to see  that in this case the vector rt, has to be constant  over time, 
independently  of the assumed  learning process.  Hence,  the discrepancy 
between  kt  and kt  is constant over time, and it follows that A log kt =  log 
kt. 
In the following  experiment,  we represent structural change by a one- 
time  permanent  change  in the growth  rate of yqt. More specifically, we 
assume  that  the  economy  is  on  a  balanced  growth  path  with  both 
sources  of  productivity  growing  at constant  rates,  but  that the  rate of 236 - HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
investment-specific  technological  change  increases  once  and  for  all, 
whereas  sector-neutral  technological  change  stays  the  same.  For this 
experiment,  we use the actual pre- and post-1973 growth rates calculated 
in  Section  2.4.  This  experiment  will  lead  to  changes  in  the  measured 
growth  rate of TFP, A log  z,  even  though  the  true growth  rate is un- 
changed.  The mismeasurement  is temporary: as the economy  converges 
to the new  balanced-growth  path,  the error converges  to zero. 
The parameters  are calibrated as follows.  We choose  a  = 0.3,  8 =  0.1, 
an investment  rate of 0.12, and y =  1.01. The initial value for yq  is taken 
to be 1.032, and its new  value 1.041. The learning technology  is specified 
as 
Tt7 =  1 -  A-l(  -  Tt,,), 
that  is,  learning  is  geometric  with  convergence  rate A from a starting 
value  of Tt,1.  We consider  two ways  of selecting  the starting values. 
First, we look at constant starting values.  Following  the study by Bahk 
and Gort (1993) of the long-term experience accumulation in new produc- 
tion plants,  we  chose  A = 0.7 and T,  = 0.8. Compared with most of the 
empirical literature on learning, these values imply a relatively slow learn- 
ing rate and a small scope  of learning.  This literature, however,  has typi- 
cally been  focused  on well-defined  learning tasks and not dealt with the 
kind of complex learning that is a likely result of the technological  change 
we consider here. We actually consider our calibration conservative,  since 
for example  the organizational  changes  in the workplace implied by the 
availability of information  technology  (IT) seem more complex and costly 
than the learning processes  analyzed in Bahk and Gort (1993). Moreover, 
it is arguable that the new  information and telecommunication  technolo- 
gies introduced  since the seventies  have incorporated a new kind of learn- 
ing or adjustment  element  because  of network externalities: firms do not 
benefit  from and  cannot  fully  learn about their new  investment  goods 
until other firms invest  as well. 
Second,  we  consider  the starting value  to be a function  of the rate of 
investment-specific  technological  progress.  In the context  of IT invest- 
ment,  Yorukoglu  (1995) argues  that  there  are important  compatibility 
problems  across different types  of capital. In particular he suggests  that 
the more advanced  the new  equipment  is relative to existing equipment, 
the lower is the initial experience  with the new  equipment.  We consider 
it reasonable  to adopt  this approach  also when  capital is defined  more 
broadly.  To  simplify  things  we  assume  that  at  the  time  the  rate  of 
investment-specific  technological  change increases,  the starting value for 
experience  declines  to Tt,1  = 0.6. Can  Technology  Improvements  Cause  Productivity  Slowdowns?  ?  237 
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3.1.2  Results  Our results for the two cases are displayed in Figures 5 and 
6. Figure 5 assumes  no  compatibility  problem,  whereas  Figure 6 does. 
Common  to these  figures is an initial slowdown  and a subsequent  recov- 
ery of measured  TFP growth,  Az. Note in Figure 5, however,  that for the 
learning parameters we selected,  there is no slowdown  in output growth. 
Since total employment  is fixed, this also means that there is no slowdown 
in labor productivity  growth.  Only with  a compatibility problem  do we 
observe  a slowdown  in output  growth.  The slowdown  in productivity 
growth  reflects reallocation of labor toward more recent vintages  due to 
the  higher  rate of technological  progress,  and with  more labor concen- 
trated in recent vintages,  average learning factors necessarily  drop.  No- 
tice also  that with  a compatibility  problem  the  decrease  in the average 
learning level  among  plants causes  a permanent  level drop in measured 
TFP, even  though  the TFP growth  rate comes back to its true value.  The 
model with a compatibility problem does produce a noticeable slowdown: 
measured  TFP growth  declines  by  11 percentage  points.  However,  the 
slowdown  is short-lived:  it lasts no longer than 5 years. 238 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
Figure  6 LEARNING  WITH  A COMPATIBILITY  PROBLEM 
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We have  also  used  our learning  formulation  to adjust  actual United 
States  capital  stock  data by  sector,  which  allows  a revision  of the  TFP 
figures.  The revisions,  which are based on the same parameters as Figure 
6 and which  also use capital stocks based  on Gordon's price-index data, 
are displayed  in Table 8. The adjustment  of the capital stock for learning 
increases  measured  TFP growth.  The effect is not particularly large over- 
all, on average about 0.2 percentage  points for the 1954-1993 period. For 
the productivity  slowdown  of the mid-seventies,  the effect is more sub- 
stantial.  Overall measured  TFP growth for the 1973-1979 period is about 
0.7 percentage  points  higher  than without  an adjustment  for learning, 
with  the  most  dramatic  effect  on  finance  and  insurance,  where  TFP 
growth  is now  about 1.2 percentage  points higher. We also include num- 
bers for the measurable  and unmeasurable  sectors as defined  in Section 
2.1. The adjustment  of the capital stock for learning affects measured TFP 
about the same way in the measurable and unmeasurable sector. Learning 
alone  has  a small effect,  increasing  measured  TFP growth  by about 0.1 Can  Technology  Improvements  Cause  Productivity  Slowdowns?  ?  239 
Table  8  TFP  GROWTH,  1954-1993  WITH  ADJUSTMENTS  FOR  LEARNING 
Growth  rate  (%) 
Sector  54-93  54-73  73-79  79-93 
Total  private sector  0.9  1.4  0.2  0.5 
Agric., forestry,  fishing  0.6  -0.4  -2.4  3.3 
Mining  -0.7  0.5  -8.4  1.1 
Construction  -1.3  -1.8  -2.2  0.0 
Manufacturing  2.6  3.2  1.7  2.3 
Durables  3.6  4.1  2.2  3.5 
Nondurables  1.6  2.4  1.0  0.6 
Transport.,  publ. util.  2.1  2.8  1.0  1.6 
Wholesale trade  1.4  1.1  0.9  2.0 
Retail  trade  -0.2  -0.0  -0.1  0.0 
Finance  and insur.  -2.2  -2.1  -0.5  -3.0 
Other services  -0.9  -1.0  0.4  -1.3 
Measurable  sector  2.1  2.6  0.7  2.2 
Unmeasurable  sector  -0.7  -0.7  -0.3  -0.8 
percentage  point overall; but correcting for a compatibility problem dur- 
ing the 1973-1979  period increases measured TFP growth by about half a 
percentage  point.  Moreover,  the measurable  sector appears  to be more 
affected by this correction than the unmeasurable  sector. 
An  increase  in  the  growth  rate of  investment-specific  technological 
change  is not the only  possible  trigger of a learning-induced  slowdown 
in productivity  growth.  Our argument  can be also applied  to an invest- 
ment  boom  whether  or not  this boom  is associated  with  technological 
change.  For example,  Young  (1992) documents  that Singapore  experi- 
enced  considerable  growth  in  investment  rates  and  capital  accumu- 
lation,  but  no  recorded  TFP growth.28 From our  perspective,  rapidly 
increasing  investment  would  induce a decline  in recorded  TFP growth, 
and  given  the  magnitude  of  the  increase  in  capital  accumulation  in 
Singapore,  zero  measured  TFP growth  does  not  seem  surprising.  In 
contrast,  however,  note  that an increase  in the  capital stock which  re- 
sults  from  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  technological  change  would  be 
more  severe,  since  it  would  also  involve  compatibility  problems  be- 
tween  new  and old technologies.29 
28. Investment  rates increased  from  9%  of GDP  in 1960  to 43%  of GDP  in 1984. 
29. As a gauge on the role of the assumption  that  labor  is freely  mobile  across  vintages, we 
also considered the vintage formulation  used in Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu 
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3.2  SLOWDOWNS  DUE TO QUALITY MISMEASUREMENTS 
We have  argued  that for most  industrialized  economies  the unmeasur- 
able sector, that is,  the sector where  output  is badly measured,  is large. 
There  is  a presumption  that  we  underestimate  output  growth  in  this 
sector, because  it is more difficult to capture quality changes  of goods  in 
this sector. We now describe a simple model in which output does have a 
quality  and  a quantity  component,  and we  make the extreme  assump- 
tion  that we  can only  measure  the  quantity  component  of output.  We 
then  study  the  quantitative  implications  for productivity  measurement 
when  the  rate of  investment-specific  technological  growth  changes  in 
the model  economy.30 
We formalize  the  distinction  between  the  quantity  and  quality  com- 
ponents  of  output  by  identifying  each  component  with  a  separate 
production  process.  We thus  postulate  that output  y at a plant  can be 
decomposed  to  read  YQ, where  Y is  the  number  of  goods,  which  is 
well  measured,  and  Q is  a  one-dimensional  quality  index  per  good, 
which  is  not  measured  at  all.  Capital  and  labor  are  inputs  to  the 
production  of quantity and quality 
Y=  (ykyl 
a  and  Q=  (ykQl-aQ 
and the capital intensity  (share) in the production of quantity and quality 
may  differ. The parameter 13  represents  the relative quantity content  of 
the output.  Note  that the production  technology  for output measured  in 
quality  units  has  constant  returns  to  scale  in  the  capital and  labor in- 
it remains there until the plant shuts down, at which point capital  depreciates  com- 
pletely. Also suppose that each plant has a fixed labor  requirement  of one. All labor  is 
paid the same wage rate, and capital  is allocated  to a plant  until the present  value of the 
sequence of marginal  products  of capital  equals the current  cost of investment. There 
will be a point at which a plant shuts down, since the marginal  product  of labor  in a 
given plant will grow at a slower rate than the wage rate. In order to simplify the 
characterization  of the optimal  investment  decision, assume  also that  the interest  rate  is 
constant. A balanced-growth  path for this economy can be summarized  by (1) a con- 
stant growth rate  for the wage rate,  and (2)  a fixed  life span of plants.  The  wage rate  at a 
point in time has to be such that the oldest vintage  finds it profitable  not to close down. 
Finally,  the amounts of investment and labor  attracted  to new plants have to be such 
that present-value  profits  are zero when the total  amount  of labor  hired for new plants 
equals the number  of laid-off  workers  from old plants shutting down. Our analysis  of 
this model framework  leads to results which are very similar  to those obtained  in the 
model with aggregation.  The qualitative  features of the model are the same, and the 
quantitative  results from the same set of parameters  for learning  are also very similar. 
We detected the largest  discrepancy  in the average  age of firms,  but this difference  was 
not large enough to generate  significantly  different  aggregate  output paths. 
30. For a related analysis of unobserved quality in an endogenous growth context see 
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puts.31 We assume  that in  the  national  income  accounts  of this  model 
economy  only  the quantity  component  of the consumption  aggregate  is 
measured,  but that investment  goods  are well measured. 
We will  model  structural  change  in  two  complementary  ways,  and 
each way  has  different  implications  for quality mismeasurement.  First, 
we will consider  the kind of experiment  that we  studied  in the previous 
section: at a point in time, the growth rate of investment-specific  techno- 
logical  change  increases  permanently.  Second,  we  consider  an  experi- 
ment  where  this  technological  shift also leads  to a relative shift toward 
quality production.  We now develop  the specific time-series implications 
of  the  experiments,  first by  considering  the  mismeasurement  on  the 
plant (vintage)  level,  and then on the aggregate level. 
3.2.1  Quality Mismeasurement on  the Plant Level  Consider  an  isolated 
production  facility,  and  note  that  the  optimal  allocation  of  a  given 
amount  of capital k and  labor I across  quantity  and  quality production 
has to satisfy 
ky 
_  8  ay  IQ  3  1  -  ay  -  -  and  -  = 
kQ  1 -  paQ  ly  1 -  p1  -  aQ 
where ky + kQ  = k and ly + IQ  = 1. This implies,  after some manipulations, 
that total output  can be written 
y  =  Ayk"ll-a, 
where  a -= 3ay +  (1 -  P)aQ and A = AyAQ,  with 
r  y 
ay  /3(1  -  ay)  '_  y 
and 
A [I  (1  -  P)  Q  (  (1  -  P)(1  - 
Q) 1-aQ  ]1- 
aI  (1-  a)  J 
31. The constant-returns-to-scale  property is assumed  for convenience:  it greatly simplifies 
decentralization  of  the  model,  and  it allows  the  identification  of relative prices  with 
marginal products.  However,  it does  carry some  features  which  for several examples 
may  appear  unrealistic.  First, the  production  of quality can often  be thought  of as a 
process  where  resources  are devoted  once and for all to develop  a new  product which 
will be available forever. Second,  by implication of our formulation,  if no effort (input) 
is devoted  to quality production,  then nothing  is produced. 242 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
Furthermore,  the subcomponents  of output  satisfy 
Y =  Ay (ykaY'1-Y)  and  Q  =  AQ (ykaQ1-aQ)1-.3 
Parenthetically, notice  from these  facts that if both quantity and quality 
are well  measured  (and there is no unobserved  learning),  then standard 
growth  accounting  allows  growth in y, A log z, to be measured perfectly. 
In our economy  the  national  income  accounts  use  quantities  only  to 
measure  total output  growth: 
A log  Yt =  8 [A log  z,  +  ayA log  k, +  (1  -  ay) A log  t], 
so that measured  TFP growth,  A log z, is 
A log  Zf =  A log  Yt -  A4  log  k, -  (1  -  a)  A log  I. 
It is  important  to  note  that  the  total  capital  share,  a,  is  used  in  this 
calculation.  From the last two equations  it follows  that 
A log  2,  =  -  A log  z,  -  aQ(1  -  3) A log  k, -  (1  -  aQ)(1  -  S) A log  It. 
There are several important characteristics of this equation. First, if /  = 1, 
so that there is no quality component,  then clearly z would  be accurately 
recovered  with the growth  accounting  procedure.  Second,  if  3 <  1, then 
so long  as all variables grow, productivity  growth is underestimated  be- 
cause of quality improvements:  A log z < A log z. Moreover, an increase in 
the rate of growth  of capital will increase the mismeasurement.  So when 
the  growth  rate of  investment-specific  technological  change  increases, 
there will be more than a one-to-one  increase in the growth rate in the cap- 
ital stock, leading to a slowdown  in measured productivity. Notice that for 
this result to obtain qualitatively, all that is needed is that some of the capi- 
tal is used  in the production  of quality (i.e.,  our assumption  that the cap- 
ital share is equal in the production of quantity and quality is not crucial).32 
Third, for a given  3 and a,  measured  productivity  growth  underesti- 
mates  actual productivity  growth  more  the  higher  aQ is relative  to ay, 
i.e.,  the more capital-intensive  is quality relative to quantity production. 
An example  where  aQ would  be large can be found  in banking services, 
where  the introduction  of computers  has added  significant convenience 
for the customer  in the ability to quickly obtain information,  move  funds 
across  deposits,  make  payments,  and  so  on.  Yet the  quantity  output, 
32. In contrast,  Howitt (1995)  assumes that  quality  is a function  of "knowledge,"  and not a 
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which  may  be  measured  as  the  number  of deposits,  is probably  more 
directly related to the number of bank employees.33 
Fourth, notice that the time path of the measured  productivity  growth 
rate will be monotone  in response  to a one-time,  permanent  increase in 
the growth  rate of investment-specific  technological  change.  To see this, 
note  that the  increase  in the  latter will  cause  the capital stock to grow 
faster, in a monotonic  way, toward its new growth rate. Since the under- 
estimate  is directly proportional  to the growth  rate of the capital stock, 
A log z will decline  monotonically  to its new  value.  As we shall see,  this 
result will be overturned  when  we  consider  the aggregation  of mismea- 
surements  over plants/vintages. 
In quantitative  terms, it is possible  to calculate the maximal measured 
(long-run)  productivity  slowdown  due to our hypothesis  of an increase 
in the growth  rate of capital as follows.  First, without  restrictions on a or 
13,  the largest possible  slowdown  would  obviously  equal the increase in 
the growth rate of capital (setting ,  = 0 and aQ = 1). However,  restricting 
this estimate  by the observed  total capital share of &, the maximum bias 
from a one-percentage-point  increase in the capital stock growth is given 
by a itself,  which  can be achieved  either by setting  3 = 0 and aQ =  a or 
by setting  aQ =  1 and /3 = 1 -  a. As an example,  a one-percentage-point 
increase  in the growth  rate of investment-specific  technological  change 
together  with  a capital share of 0.4 implies  a 1 x  1/(1 -  0.4) increase in 
the long-run  growth  rate of the capital stock, and the maximal long-run 
slowdown  in productivity  is therefore 0.67%. 
3.2.2  The Aggregation of Quality Mismeasurement  over Plants  Now  sup- 
pose,  in line  with  the  formal structure of Section  3.1.1,  that aggregate 
output  is  produced  in  plants  with  different  capital vintages.  Then  we 
know from the plant level analysis of quality mismeasurement  above that 
correctly measured  output  at time t in a T-year-old plant satisfies 
Yt,, =  Aytt,'t,l 
but that measured  output  at this plant,  t  = 
Y,,,  is given by 
=,T  A(  (vtkI'ay  )-y  YAT. =Ayytkt,tT  t. 
The  allocation  of  labor across  plants  here  is parallel to  that in Section 
3.1.1,  so  that It, =  rt,it  =  Itrt,/Jlrt,s.  It follows  that aggregate  output 
33. In the U.S.  national income  accounts,  measured  bank sector output is mainly based on 
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satisfies  the same expression  as in that context.  Hence,  in the absence of 
measurement  problems,  the accounting  for productivity  growth  would 
be straightforward  and not give rise to errors. However,  with the lack of 
measurement  of quality on the plant level,  aggregate measured output Yt 
equals S1  Yt,,.  Now  note that the relative measured  output at t in plants 
t -  T and  t -  1, respectively,  equals 
t,  A  Y  [it-(1  -  Y)  -1]a  y  ll  t,y}T 
Yt1  Ay  [ytiit:.1-~  t  t  , 
so that 
Yt  =  Yt,  r1 r. 
T =1 
With  the  special  case  of  equal  capital  intensities  across  quantity  and 
quality production  (aQ =  ay), this expression  simplifies  further: 
Ay 
Yt  =  A  1  E  r  t,T' 
In this case,  since all variables on the right-hand side of this equation are 
true values  (not mismeasured),  we can compare directly with actual total 
output,  which  satisfies  a similar equation: 
Yt = Yt,  I  rtT' 
T =1 
For illustration,  let us again focus on the special case when capital intensi- 
ties  are the  same.  It is clear that since  T= r~  =  (E='  rt,),  we  cannot 
exclude  different  transitional  properties  for measured  output  than  for 
true output  (with an = sign,  the growth rates of measured  output would 
be  3 times that of true output at all points in time).34  Hence,  productivity 
measurement  as well will exhibit dynamics  which are nontrivially differ- 
ent than those  for output. 
The economic  interpretation  of the above  algebra is as follows.  True 
output  in  our  model  has  exact  aggregation  over  vintages,  so  that  a 
monotone  increase  in  the  rate of growth  of the  capital stock resulting 
from investment-specific  technological  change  will lead  to a monotone 
increase  in the  growth  rate of true aggregate  output-due  to aggrega- 
34. In the long  run,  of course,  the distribution  of labor and capital across plants does  not 
change,  and  so S= 1 rt,  does  not change,  and measured  output  will grow exactly at / 
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tion  (linearity),  vintage  effects  are not present.  Measured  output,  how- 
ever, is not a linear function  of true plant outputs,  but a nonlinear  one: 
there are nontrivial vintage effects in the aggregation  of measured  output over 
plants. In particular, as we  shall see  in our examples  below,  there is an 
initial  slowdown  in  measured  output  growth  relative  to  true  output 
growth.  Similarly, measured  productivity  growth will drop more during 
the first 10-20  years than in the long run. As the increase in the rate of 
growth  of capital is in its initial phase,  there is concentration  of labor in 
the  most  recent  vintages,  and  thus  greater weight  is placed  where  the 
errors are large.  Only  after substantial  time,  when  the rate of growth  is 
the  same  in all vintages,  will  the  year-to-year  mismeasurement  be  the 
same  in all vintages,  and the underestimate  of productivity  growth  be- 
come constant. 
3.2.3  Exogenous Changes in the Relative  Importance  of Quality  The second 
expression  of structural change that we consider is an exogenous  change 
over time in the quality component.  This is a stand-in exercise for devel- 
oping  a richer framework  where  quality is a state variable, and where  a 
higher  rate of technological  change  can have  more fundamental  effects 
on quality production  than in our model.  In a richer framework, it would 
for example  be possible  to better capture how  the emergence  of comput- 
ers would  orient the allocation of labor more toward quality in the form 
of the new  kinds  of services  that computers  can provide. 
We do not have  direct, aggregate  evidence  that there has been a shift 
toward  quality. However,  postwar  patent data suggest  that quality mis- 
measurement  may  be  more  important  now  than  it  was  prior  to  the 
seventies.  To understand  why,  suppose  that we  interpret  quality  mis- 
measurement  as primarily occurring  when  new  goods  are introduced, 
and note  that only  patents  for new  final goods  can represent  a problem 
for growth  accounting.  This is true because  any undermeasurement  of 
the output  of new  intermediate  goods  will cancel with  input underesti- 
mates  when  the  same  goods  are used  as inputs.  Hence,  a shift toward 
patents  for  final  goods  will  make  the  quality  mismeasurement  more 
severe.  On  the  basis  of  patent  data  from  the  United  States  and  else- 
where,  we  split  the  patents  into  two  groups:  patents  for new  kinds  of 
final outputs,  and patents  for new  kinds  of intermediate  goods.  Figure 
7 shows  the fraction of total patents  which  apply to final output  goods. 
The figure reveals a nontrivial upward  shift around the mid-seventies 
both for the United  States data and for the international data. 
Our theoretical experiment,  then, is to make the parameter /  decrease. 
This can be  viewed  either  as an increase  in  the  relative  importance  of 
quality in general output,  or as an increase in the mismeasurement  prob- 246 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
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lems  associated  with  output.  A change  in  3 will have two effects.  It will 
imply the desired move toward a larger quality component,  but it will also 
lead  to  a "reduced-form"  productivity  increase:  recall that the  optimal 
allocation of inputs across quality and quantity components  implies that a 
factor B3(1  -  3)l1- multiplies the aggregate production function. To  isolate 
the first effect,  we  premultiply  the production  relations  of both  quality 
and  quantity  with  the  disembodied  factor  /-8(1  -  3)-(1-~.  This  way, 
changes in 13  will have no effect on aggregate output as correctly measured 
(i.e.,  in quality units),  provided  inputs  are optimally allocated. 
One  aspect  of structural change  appearing  in this way, as opposed  to 
solely through  an increase in the growth rate of capital, is that there may 
be  a permanent  drop  in measured  output  growth  following  structural 
change.  If  there  is  a  permanent  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of 
investment-specific  technological  change  but no change  in  3, there will 
be  a  decrease  in  measured  total-factor  productivity  growth,  but  the 
growth  rate  of  output,  and  of  labor  productivity,  will  increase.  This 
result is due to the simple  fact that in our quality framework,  where  the 
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tity and quality, increases  in the growth  rate of capital will increase  the 
growth  rates of both quality and quantity. However,  when  the structural 
change  is  expressed  via  an  increase  in  the  quality  component-a  de- 
crease in ,-there  will be a permanent  decrease in measured  output and 
labor productivity  growth  rates. Our particular experiment  is to assume 
a slow  diffusion  curve for /,  letting it move from 0.9 to 0.8 over a period 
of  10 years  (as the  rate of investment-specific  technological  change  in- 
creases),  with  the largest changes  in ,  taking place in the middle  of this 
period. 
3.2.4  Results  We perform  several  experiments.  First, we  consider  the 
effect of a permanent  increase in the rate of investment-specific  techno- 
logical change  in an economy  with unobserved  quality and no learning, 
and where  the capital intensities  in quantity and quality production  are 
equal (ay =  aQ). Second,  we  assume  that, in addition  to the increase in 
the growth  rate of capital, there is a shift towards a higher quality share 
Figure  8 UNOBSERVED  QUALITY 
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Figure  9 A SHIFT  TOWARDS  MORE  UNOBSERVED  QUALITY 
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in output  (a decrease  in ,B).  Third, we assume  that there is learning with 
a compatibility  problem.  In  the  fourth  and  final  experiment,  we  look  at 
the possibility  that the capital intensity  in quality production  is large in 
relative  terms  (ay  <  aQ). Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  parameter  values 
correspond  to the ones  in the previous  section. 
The results  are displayed  in Figures 8-11.  An increase  in the rate of 
investment-specific  technological  change induces more capital accumula- 
tion,  and  thereby  an  increase  in  the  rate of  growth  of both  observed 
quantity and unobserved  quality. Without learning (T,,1  =  1), this results 
in a permanent  increase in the growth rate of output and labor productiv- 
ity and a permanent  decline  in the growth  rate of measured  total-factor 
productivity,  as can be seen  in Figure 8. While we  observe  a persistent 
decline  in  total-factor  productivity  growth,  this  effect  is  not  quantita- 
tively important. 
The  quantitative  effect  of  a  shift  towards  a higher  quality  share  in 
output  is  comparable  to  the  effect  the  compatibility  problem  has;  see Can  Technology  Improvements  Cause  Productivity  Slowdowns?  ?  249 
Figure  10 A SHIFT  TOWARDS  MORE  UNOBSERVED  QUALITY  AND 
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Figure 9. We observe  a decline  in output  growth  and a substantial  and 
persistent  decline  in total-factor productivity  growth.35 
Adding  learning  with  a compatibility  problem  does  not substantially 
change  this effect,  as Figure 10 shows.36 
Figure 11, finally, shows  an example where the capital share in quality 
production  is higher than in quantity production.  We use aQ =  1 and ay 
=  , so that a  =  0.3,  and we  assume  that  3 is constant,  that there is no 
learning,  and  that the rates of technological  change  are the same  as in 
the other figures.  The graph shows  that the mismeasurement  increases, 
and that the slowdown  is larger in relative terms, with otherwise  similar 
features  to the baseline  case in Figure 8. 
35. This persistence  is to some extent due to the assumed  slow diffusion of the change in  3. 
36. Note  that the "true" Solow  residual in Figure 10 is calculated by using  the true output 
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Figure 11 CAPITAL  IS MORE  EFFICIENT  IN THE  PRODUCTION  OF 
QUALITY 
(a) Output  Growth  (meosured)  (b) Solow Residuol (meosured) 
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3.3 A CALIBRATED  MODEL  OF U.S. PRODUCTIVITY  SLOWDOWN 
In this section  we provide  a calibrated synthesis  of the previous  analysis 
using  a more  disaggregated  model  in line  with  the  setup  used  at the 
outset  of  this  section.  Following  our discussion  of measurement  prob- 
lems  in  the  various  industries,  we  consider  two  sectors.  In the  mea- 
surable  sector,  which  represents  the  durable-  and  nondurable-goods- 
producing  industries,  output is perfectly measured.  In the unmeasurable 
sector, which  represents  services,  production  has a quality and a quan- 
tity component  and measured  output  reflects only the quantity compo- 
nent.  We assume  that there is learning,  and that the mismeasurement  in 
the  second  sector  is  represented  by  the  kind  of  mismeasurement  we 
analyze  above. 
For this  simulation,  investment-specific  technological  change  is  not 
represented  by a one-time  regime change,  but we use Gordon's relative 
price  series  for durable  equipment  to represent  this  process.  Since  for 
this  experiment  the  rate of investment-specific  technological  change  is 
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not constant,  we  formulate the learning process as follows.  The starting 
value  for experience  is  Tt,1  =  Toe-,  where  q is an unweighted  10-year 
moving  average  of past rates of investment-specific  technological  prog- 
ress.  The  moving  average  was  used  in  order  to  capture  the  fact that 
compatibility  has  to do with  the  existing  skill of workers,  and because 
workers  allocated  to the newest  technology  do not all necessarily  have 
the most  recent technological  experience.  For specific parameter values 
we  chose  To and  0 so  that  the  starting value  for the  original balanced 
growth  path  is 0.8 and  the  starting value  for the new  balanced  path is 
0.6,  the  latter reflecting  poorer  compatibility  as  the  improvements  in 
capital occur at a higher rate. 
The capital accumulation  process  in this economy  corresponds  to the 
one in the United States economy.  For each sector the ratio of investment 
to GDP in each period  equals  the corresponding  investment  rate in the 
United  States economy,  where  the measurable and unmeasurable  sector 
are as defined  in  Section  2.  We also  equate  labor income  shares  in the 
two  sectors  with  the corresponding  average labor income  shares in the 
Figure  12 LEARNING  IN A CALIBRATED  TWO-SECTOR  ECONOMY 
(a) Output  Growth  (measured)  (b) Solow Residual  (meosured) 
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Figure  13 LEARNING  AND QUALITY  CHANGE  IN A CALIBRATED  TWO- 
SECTOR  ECONOMY 
(a)  Output  Growth (meosured) 
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United  States economy.  We assume  that the rate of disembodied  techno- 
logical  change  is  the  same  in  the  measurable  and  the  unmeasurable 
sector. The process  for disembodied  technical change corresponds  to the 
neutral technical  change  we  have calculated for the United  States econ- 
omy in Section 2.2. 
Figure 12 displays  growth rates for measured output and for measured 
and true disembodied  technical change.  Comparing parts (a) and (b), we 
see  that the  behavior  of measured  productivity  growth  is qualitatively 
similar  to  that  of  true productivity  growth,  but  that it underestimates 
true productivity  growth  on average.  This is reflected in part (c), which 
shows  that the measured  productivity never attains the same level as the 
true productivity  (see  Figure 3).  The decline  in measured  productivity 
after 1975 is much  more dramatic than the decline  in true productivity. 
As  a negative  result  with  respect  to  our model's  ability  to  replicate  a 
productivity  slowdown,  we  have  to note  that it predicts  a very  strong 
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We next  assume  that there  is also  a shift  towards  quality  that takes 
place in 1970. The results from this simulation are displayed  in Figure 13. 
This feature tends  to amplify the slowdown  in the early 1970s, but does 
not have any other noticeable  effects. 
4.  Conclusion 
We have  reviewed  the  productivity  statistics  and  discussed  measure- 
ment  issues  as well  as briefly reviewed  a number of suggested  explana- 
tions for the productivity  slowdown.  As a comment  on the statistics and 
on the literature, we then suggested  a complementary  candidate explana- 
tion for the slowdown:  an increase in the rate of investment-specific,  or 
capital-embodied,  technological  change. 
The  argument  was  presented  in  two  steps.  We first provided  some 
evidence  that  there  indeed  has  been  an  acceleration  in  technological 
change,  and that it started around the mid-seventies,  i.e., at the same time 
as the  productivity  slowdown  began.  We do not view  this evidence  as 
more than suggestive,  but we do think there is reason to take it seriously. 
Second,  we used  a set of simple vintage capital models  to discuss how an 
increase in the rate of capital-embodied  technological change could lead to 
decreases  in measured  productivity  growth.  The channels  we focused  on 
were learning (about the new, more advanced capital) and quality mismea- 
surement of final outputs.  We believe these two channels are real phenom- 
ena, and our task was to use "reasonable" parameterizations to get an idea 
of the  potential  quantitative  importance  they  might  have.  Some  of the 
parameters  needed  in  these  exercises  are inherently  difficult  to assign 
values  to. For example,  we  adopt learning parameters from the applied 
learning  literature,  which  focuses  on  much  more  concrete  tasks  than 
those  necessitated  by the  adoption  of much  of the  new  equipment  we 
have in mind.  Similarly, the relative importance of unmeasured  quality in 
final output  and the relative importance of the new  capital in producing 
this quality are also parameterized  on the basis of little quantitative guid- 
ance. As a result, we do not view our quantitative findings as conclusive. 
We found  the  magnitude  of a slowdown  due  to learning  alone  to be 
relatively small, unless  the compatibility problems between  the new and 
the  old  capital  increase  with  the  higher  rate of  technological  change. 
However,  for the recent increases  in technological  change,  compatibility 
problems probably were quite important. We found the learning-induced 
slowdown  to be relatively  short-lived,  about as short-lived  as the slow- 
down  recorded  in  the  measurable  sectors  of  the  economy.  Finally, we 
pointed  out that increases  in the investment  rates also can produce slow- 
downs  due to learning,  even  in the absence of technological  change,  but 254 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
that such slowdowns  are less severe in relative terms, since they are not 
associated  with  increased  compatibility problems. 
The slowdown  due  to capital-induced  quality mismeasurements  also 
seemed  to have  some  potential,  both in terms of magnitude  and  dura- 
tion.  We also  found  that the quality mismeasurement  story produces  a 
temporary  large drop in measured  productivity,  something  which  came 
about from nontrivial  vintage  effects.  Quantitatively,  we  found  that the 
effects of quality change  are much more important when  there is a struc- 
tural change  from quantity  to quality production.  Although  we  present 
some  evidence  along  these  lines  and we  do believe  that the new  capital 
introduced  since the seventies  (especially  information capital) has made 
quality a more important  part of output  in relative terms, it is extremely 
difficult  to make  quantitative  statements  about  the  extent  of this  phe- 
nomenon.  In sum,  our experiments  indicate some potential,  but the low 
confidence  that we  have  in some  of our key parameter values  prevents 
us from claiming either success  or failure. 
The shortcuts  taken in the model formulation and the empirical imple- 
mentation  of our theory  are many, and we  abstain from making  a wish 
list.37 We do  believe  it is  important  to  look  more  carefully  at the  role 
capital plays  in improving  the quality of new  goods  and services,  and it 
is clearly necessary  to go beyond  the simple formalization we employ  in 
the paper. 
Let us also make some final remarks. First, the hypothesis  of an increase 
in the rate of investment-specific  technological  change likely has implica- 
tions beyond  those  we  study  here,  and a look at these  would  give more 
information  about  the validity  of the hypothesis.  One  such implication 
has already been  explored  in parallel work: the implication for wage  in- 
equality.  For suppose,  as has  been  documented  in a number  of classic 
studies  [see, e.g.,  Griliches (1969) and, more recently, Flug and Hercowitz 
(1995), who  use  international  data], that capital is more complementary 
with  skilled  than with  unskilled  labor. Then as the new  capital becomes 
available at a higher  speed,  the wages  of skilled agents  will tend  to rise 
relative  to those  of unskilled  agents.  This is indeed  what  we  have  ob- 
served; there was a sharp increase in wage inequality in the late seventies 
in the United States, and the wage gap has increased since then.38 Krusell 
et al. (1995) investigate  this hypothesis  in detail. 
Second,  to the extent  it is taken seriously,  the view  that learning and 
mismeasurements  caused  the  measured  productivity  slowdown  repre- 
sents  an optimistic  assessment  of the  past  and  current state of affairs. 
37. Besides,  we  prefer to stay close  in spirit to the approach  advocated  in Romer (1992). 
38. Similarly, in Europe the wage  gap did not increase much,  but the unemployment  rate 
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First, if the slowdown  is due to learning, it is normal under the particular 
circumstances,  and the implied expectation is that growth and productiv- 
ity will go back up. Second,  if the problem is mismeasurement  of quality, 
then there is no need  to worry either; measured  decreases  in the growth 
rate of productivity  are simply misleading  in this case. Notwithstanding 
the  logic  of  this  position,  there  would  still be a need  to deal with  the 
widespread  perception  that  real wages  have  gone  down.  At  least  for 
large fractions  of the  population,  in particular the less  fortunate  ones, 
real wage  growth  has  been  dismal  for a long  period.  Again,  mismea- 
surement  could  turn this fact to a less worrisome  one: it is the overesti- 
mated  growth  rates of price increases  that cause  the  slowdown  in real 
wage  growth,  and properly adjusted,  real wage  growth has not been as 
catastrophic.  However,  as suggested  above,  it may also be that the real 
wage  decline  has not just been a statistical artifact, and that it reflects the 
kind of distributional  change  which  may follow  from an increase in the 
rate of investment-specific  technological  change. 
Appendix.  Data  Sources 
Industry  output  is  value-added  or gross-product-originating  (GPO) in 
constant  dollars  from the  BEA. In 1991 the  BEA revised  industry  GPO 
data substantially, and it is now publishing  constant-1987-dollar industry 
GPO data starting in 1977. To obtain industry output series for the period 
1954-1993,  we have linked the constant-1982-dollar prerevision industry 
GPO  series  from  1954 to  1976 with  the  current revised  series  in  1977. 
Industry  employment  is the number  of full-time equivalent  employees. 
Equipment  and  structures  capital stocks  are constructed  from industry 
investment  data from the  BEA, assuming  constant  geometric  deprecia- 
tion.  The annual  depreciation  rates are 12.4% for equipment  and 5.6% 
for  structures.  For structures  we  use  constant-1987-dollar  investment 
data. For equipment  we  use  current-dollar investment  data and deflate 
the series with  the PDE price index or Gordon's equipment  price index. 
When  we  correct for the effects of learning,  we  construct a capital stock 
index  for equipment  as described  in Section 3.1.1,  assuming  a learning 
rate of A =  0.7 and initial experience  of To  = 0.8 before 1973 and To = 0.6 
after 1973. 
With one exception,  we  assume  that the total capital and labor shares 
are  constant  throughout  the  period.  We  calculate  average  income 
shares  from  1947  to  1987  based  on  updated  data  from  Jorgenson, 
Gollop,  and Fraumeni (1987). Moreover, we assign  shares to equipment 
and structures  according to Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and Krusell (1995), 
where  these  shares  are selected  to match  long-run  return equalization 256 *  HORNSTEIN  & KRUSELL 
between  the  two  types  of  capital.  As  a result,  equipment  is  assigned 
57% of  the  total  capital  share  and  structures  43%.  This  is  close  to 
findings  based  on  long-run  cost  data in Dumenil  and  Levy  (1990). We 
apply  the same capital-share division  in all sectors. The capital share for 
the  whole  private  sector  implied  by  these  sectoral  shares  is  33%. Jor- 
genson's  capital-share numbers  are somewhat  high in comparison  with 
what others have used; for example,  Gordon (1990) uses  25%. 
We do not assume  that the capital and labor income shares are constant 
when  we  construct  the productivity  of the PDE sector relative to that of 
the remainder of the economy  in Section 2.4. We use the income compo- 
nents  of industry  GPO from the BEA to define  capital and labor income 
shares.  Not  all income  components  can be unambiguously  assigned  to 
capital or labor income.  We assume  that from all sectoral income compo- 
nents,  labor compensation  can be unambiguously  allocated to labor in- 
come,  and  interest  payments,  corporate  profits  before  tax,  inventory 
valuation adjustment,  rental income,  and capital consumption  allowance 
can be unambiguously  allocated to capital income.  We calculate the labor 
income  share in the sum of these  income  components,  and assume  that 
the labor income share in the ambiguous  income components  is the same 
as the income  share calculated above.  Again we assume  that equipment 
capital  receives  a constant  fraction of  capital income,  namely  0.57.  To 
calculate  the  labor income  share  of  the  investment  sector  we  identify 
the PDE-producing  sector with the durable-goods  manufacturing sector. 
The  remaining  industries  are identified  with  the  consumption-goods- 
producing  sector. We use a three-period moving  average of labor income 
shares.  We also  allocate  the  stock  of  structures  in  the  durable-goods 
manufacturing  sector to the PDE-producing  sector and the remainder to 
the consumption-goods  and services sector. 
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1. Documenting  the  Slowdown 
The  paper  by  Hornstein  and  Krusell  (hereafter  HK)  documents  the 
productivity-growth  slowdown,  treats some of the related measurement 
issues,  and introduces  a theoretical explanation  of the slowdown  based 
on two apparently perverse channels  through which increases in the rate 
of investment-specific  technological  change can lead to decreases in mea- 
sured  productivity  growth.  This comment  qualifies  HK's discussion  of 
the  facts and  measurement  issues  and questions  the plausibility  of the 
theoretical explanation. 
The authors  document  the productivity-growth  slowdown,  which be- 
gan  in  the  late  1960s and  exhibits  a sharp transition  to slower  growth 
around  1972-1973.  Unfortunately,  HK's tables are based  on official data 
that were  made  obsolete  by important  revisions  released  in early 1996. 
The revisions  shift all official U.S.  government  output  and productivity 
data from a fixed 1987 base year (which has the effect of underweighting 
computers  prior  to  1987 and  overweighting  computers  after  1987) to 
chain weights  that more accurately reflect the shifting relative prices and 
Comment 259 
Shapiro, M. D., and D. Wilcox. (1996).  Mismeasurement  in the consumer price 
index: An evaluation. NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual,  this issue. 
Solow, R. M. (1957). Technical  change and the aggregate production function. 
Review  of Economics  and  Statistics  39:312-320. 
Solow, R. M. (1959).  Investment and technical  progress. In K. Arrow,  S. Karlin, 
and P. Suppes (eds.). Mathematical  Methods  in the  Social  Sciences,  Stanford,  CA: 
Stanford  University  Press. 
Summers, L. (1982). Comments on "Economic  policy in the face of declining 
productivity growth" by Nordhaus. European  Economic  Review  18(2):163-169. 
Thurow,  L. (1981). Solving the productivity  problem. In L. Thurow,  A. Packer, 
and H. Samuels (eds.). Strengthening  the  Economy:  Studies  in Productivity,  Wash- 
ington: Center  for Democratic  Policy,  pp. 9-19. 
Thurow,  L. C. (1987).  Can America  compete in the world economy?  In Y. Shetty, 
and V. M. Buehler.  Quality,  Productivity,  and Innovation:  Strategies  for Gain- 
ing Competitive  Advantage. New York:  Elsevier  Science. 
Yelle,  L. (1979).  The learning  curve:  Historical  review and comprehensive  survey. 
Decision  Sciences  10:302-328. 
Yorukoglu,  M. (1995).  The information  technology paradox.  Mimeo. 
Young, A. (1992).  A tale of two cities:  Factor  accumulation  and technical  change 
in Hong Kong and Singapore.  NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual,  pp. 13-54. 
Comment 
ROBERT  J. GORDON 
Northwestern  University  and  National  Bureau  of Economic  Research 
1. Documenting  the  Slowdown 
The  paper  by  Hornstein  and  Krusell  (hereafter  HK)  documents  the 
productivity-growth  slowdown,  treats some of the related measurement 
issues,  and introduces  a theoretical explanation  of the slowdown  based 
on two apparently perverse channels  through which increases in the rate 
of investment-specific  technological  change can lead to decreases in mea- 
sured  productivity  growth.  This comment  qualifies  HK's discussion  of 
the  facts and  measurement  issues  and questions  the plausibility  of the 
theoretical explanation. 
The authors  document  the productivity-growth  slowdown,  which be- 
gan  in  the  late  1960s and  exhibits  a sharp transition  to slower  growth 
around  1972-1973.  Unfortunately,  HK's tables are based  on official data 
that were  made  obsolete  by important  revisions  released  in early 1996. 
The revisions  shift all official U.S.  government  output  and productivity 
data from a fixed 1987 base year (which has the effect of underweighting 
computers  prior  to  1987 and  overweighting  computers  after  1987) to 
chain weights  that more accurately reflect the shifting relative prices and 260 *  GORDON 
quantities of computers.  The effect of the revisions is to decrease substan- 
tially  the  growth  rate of labor productivity  and  TFP after 1987 and  in- 
crease both rates prior to 1987. 
The revised  data,  presented  in my  Table 1, provide  a quite different 
picture of productivity  acceleration and deceleration.  TFP growth  in the 
aggregate  (private  business)  economy  exhibits  a  marked  deceleration 
between  1972-1979  and 1979-1994  in the revised data, in contrast to the 
acceleration  for the aggregate  economy  reported by HK from unrevised 
data in the top line of their Table 2. This further deceleration is important 
for distinguishing  among  hypotheses  to explain the slowdown.  Factors 
specific  to  the  1970s  (e.g.,  oil  prices)  now  lack conviction  as  explana- 
tions,  whereas  factors that intensified  in the  1980s and  1990s (possibly 
measurement  problems)  may become  more convincing. 
The  revisions  change  the  growth  rate of  TFP in  the  manufacturing 
sector relative to the total private economy  (and thus by inference to the 
"residual"  nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  sector,  i.e.,  (NFNM).  In  HK's 
Table 2, TFP growth  in manufacturing  for the most recent period,  1979- 
1993, exceeded  TFP growth  in  the  private economy  by 0.9 percentage 
points  (1.6% vs.  0.7%), about the same as in the revised  data (1.19% vs. 
0.23%). But during the 1970s the relationship is quite different. Whereas 
in HK's Table 2 TFP growth  for manufacturing  performed better than in 
the private economy  (-0.2%  vs.  -0.6%),  in my Table 1 growth in manu- 
facturing  performed  substantially  worse  (0.33% vs.  0.85%). The  sharp 
downward  revision  of  TFP growth,  which  is  concentrated  outside  of 
Table  1  DIMENSIONS  OF THE  U.S. PRODUCTIVITY  SLOWDOWN,  1950- 
1972  VS. 1972-1994 
1972-1994 
1950-  1972-  1979-  1972-  minus 
Concept  and sector  1972  1979  1994  1994  1950-1972 
Output per hour 
Private  business sector  3.12  1.50  1.22  1.31  -1.81 
Nonfarm  business  2.65  1.30  1.06  1.13  -1.52 
Manufacturing  2.62  2.17  2.62  2.47  -0.15 
Nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  2.66  0.95  0.57  0.67  -1.99 
Total Factor Productivity  (TFP) 
Private business  sector  1.93  0.85  0.23  0.43  -1.50 
Nonfarm  business  1.64  0.67  0.05  0.25  -1.39 
Manufacturing  1.54  0.33  1.19  0.90  -0.64 
Nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  1.69  0.81  -0.31  0.03  -1.66 
Sources:  Bureau of Labor Statistics and author's calculations. Comment*  261 
manufacturing,  makes obsolete  the authors' observation  that the United 
States "is among  a minority  [of countries]  showing  partial improvement 
in the 1980s." 
What  do  these  data  tell  us  about  the  contribution  of  capital  to  the 
productivity  slowdown?  Simple algebra shows  that the growth of capital 
per hour  can be computed  from Table 1 as the  difference  between  the 
growth  rate of output  per hour and the growth  rate of TFP, divided  by 
the income  share of capital. This calculation reveals the striking fact that 
growth  in  capital  per  hour  actually  accelerated  in  manufacturing  after 
1972,  indicating  that  capital made  a negative contribution  to  the  slow- 
down  in  labor productivity  growth  in  manufacturing.  In NFNM  both 
capital per hour  and  TFP share the blame for the  slowdown,  although 
TFP accounts  for 85% of it. 
2. Measurement  Issues 
While measurement  problems  have been much discussed,  until recently 
they  did  not  seem  to  be  a  plausible  explanation  for the  TFP growth 
slowdown,  simply  because  measurement  problems  "have always  been 
with  us."  Even  if we  could  come  up  with  reasons  to believe  that TFP 
growth  had been  understated  by, say, 1.0 percentage  point  per annum 
since  1972, the  same  measurement  issues  would  make the understate- 
ment  for the  pre-1972 period just as great. The magnitude  of the slow- 
down  would  remain  unchanged  (although  the percentage  decline  in the 
growth  rate would  be substantially  reduced). 
Two factors have  emerged  recently that provide  a contribution  to ex- 
plaining  the  slowdown.  First, as Griliches (1994)1 has  pointed  out  and 
HK document  in their Tables 4 and 5, the share of the economy  where 
output  is "unmeasurable"  (i.e.,  difficult to measure)  has increased  sub- 
stantially, from 48% in 1954 to 66% in 1993. This compositional  effect can 
explain  0.46  percentage  points  of  the  productivity-growth  slowdown 
between  1954-1973  and 1979-1993,  according to HK's Table 4.2 This is a 
striking finding,  since the compositional  shift seems  to explain 46/60, or 
77% of  the  total  slowdown  over  those  two  intervals.  This  is  a much 
larger  share  of  the  slowdown  than  has  been  explained  by  any  other 
factor proposed  in the literature. 
Unfortunately,  the  slowdown  to be explained  is much  greater in the 
revised  data,  as  shown  in  my  Table 1.  Between  1950-1972  and  1979- 
1. References  in this comment  are to the list in HK. 
2. Comparing  1979-1993  with 1954-1973,  the aggregate slowdown  in Table 4 is 0.6, and the 
average  slowdown  in the two  sectors  (taking an average  of the  1954 and  1993 weights 
from Table 5) is 0.14,  so that the compositional  effect explains the difference  (0.46). 262 *  GORDON 
1994, the slowdown  for the private business  sector in my Table 1 is 1.70 
points  per annum,  not 0.60 as in HK's Tables 2 and 4 for the comparable 
periods.  While  we  do  not  have  revised  data  that  would  allow  us  to 
compute  the compositional  effect,  it will  surely amount  to one-third  or 
less  of the total slowdown  that requires an explanation. 
Another  measurement  contribution  is the so-called  "formula bias" in 
the  CPI.  As  discussed  in  the  interim  report  of  the  CPI commission 
(Boskin et al. 1995), this amounts  to 0.5% per annum  and applies  to the 
period from 1978 to 1995. Because it does  not apply before 1978, it helps 
to  explain  the  productivity-growth  slowdown  in  the  post-1978  period 
relative  to  pre-1978.  Multiplying  by  the  share  of  consumption  (net  of 
imputed  rent  on  owner-occupied  dwellings)  in  total  private  business 
output  (about  78%), the  formula  bias  could  account  for  a  0.4% per- 
annum  downward  bias  in  the  growth  rate  of  private  output  and  in 
private-sector  TFP. 
Combined  with  the  compositional  effect,  these  two  factors could  ex- 
plain as much as 0.9 percentage  points of the slowdown,  a very substan- 
tial amount.  The two factors support and extend the authors' conclusion 
that measurement  problems  are large and have  increased  substantially 
during the postwar  period. 
HK introduce  another  measurement  issue,  the adjustment  based  on 
my price research,  which  they apply to the output of durable goods  and 
the  stock  of  durable  goods.  As  they  point  out,  any  correction  for  a 
secular upward  bias in conventional  price indexes  for durable goods  has 
a  two-sided  effect  on  TFP by  simultaneously  boosting  the  output  of 
durable  goods  industries  and  raising  the  growth  rate of the  capital of 
producers'  durables.  Their  correction  for  this  upward  bias,  based  on 
numbers  from  my  book  and  extrapolations  therefrom,  boosts  TFP 
growth  in the  durable-goods  sector by 2 percentage  points  per annum 
while  cutting TFP growth in the remaining sectors by 0.3-0.4  percentage 
point per annum. 
My price indexes  for durables grow more slowly  than official indexes 
for a host of reasons; the authors err in attributing the difference entirely 
to quality change  and err even  more by equating  "quality adjustments" 
to  the  concept  of  "technological  change  embodied  in  new  durable 
goods."  There  are two  different  points,  both  of which  may  be  under- 
stood  by  assuming  a  society  entirely  devoid  of  technological  change. 
First, the official price indexes  may err in measuring  the prices of goods 
of constant  quality for a host  of reasons,  including  traditional substitu- 
tion bias when  the relative prices of two goods  change  for reasons  hav- 
ing  nothing  to do with  technological  change.  Second,  the official price 
indexes  may err by neglecting  quality change  in a technologically  stag- Comment  263 
nant  society.  For instance,  there  may be a technological  frontier which 
allows  the production  of a variety of different refrigerators ranging from 
inexpensive  and energy-inefficient  to expensive  and energy-efficient.  A 
change in energy prices may cause consumers  to shift from the former to 
the  latter, and  the  official indexes  may  miss  entirely  or understate  the 
extent  to which  the  resulting  price increase  actually represents  an im- 
provement  in quality. But because  there has been no technical change by 
assumption,  just  a shift  in  the  mix  of  energy-inefficient  and  -efficient 
models,  any error in the official price indexes  has no implication for the 
rate of technological  change.  This type  of quality change  is sometimes 
called  "cost-increasing"  quality  change,  because  the  energy-efficient 
models  are more costly to produce at a given level of technology  but will 
be voluntarily  purchased  if the level of energy prices is sufficiently high. 
In principle,  then,  the differing secular growth rates of my alternative 
price indexes  and the official price indexes  for durable goods  provide no 
evidence  at all on the rate of equipment-embodied  technological  change. 
This point is of theoretical importance,  but does not qualify the nature of 
the  authors'  quantitative  adjustments  to  TFP; if  my  alternative  price 
indexes  are correct and  the  official indexes  are incorrect,  then  official 
measures  of  real output  and  capital  input  should  be  adjusted  by  the 
difference  in the growth  rates of the two price indexes,  no matter what 
the cause of that difference. 
3.  Can a Technological  Acceleration  Cause  a 
TFP Deceleration? 
The authors'  basic  (and perverse)  hypothesis  is that an acceleration  in 
the  rate of  investment-specific  technological  change  can  lead  to  a de- 
crease in measured  TFP growth.  They base their hypothesis  of an accel- 
eration in technological  change on Figure 2, which plots the price of PDE 
relative to nondurable  consumption  goods  and services.  However,  Fig- 
ure  2  does  not  support  their  basic  presumption  of  an  acceleration  in 
technical change.  Clearly the evolution  of that price ratio was influenced 
by the oil shocks of the 1970s. Taking intervals that are not influenced  by 
the  oil  shocks,  we  can calculate  that  the  annual  rate of growth  of the 
price ratio in Figure 2 was  -3.5%  from 1953-1970  and  -3.4%  for 1970- 
1993, thus providing  no evidence  of an acceleration of the rate of decline. 
The authors  develop  and  simulate  a model  to assess  the effects  of a 
technological  acceleration. Leaving aside the unconvincing  nature of their 
evidence  from Figure 2 on the existence  of this acceleration, none of their 
simulations  helps  us understand  the productivity  slowdown.  Neither  of 
the learning  simulations  in Figure 5 or 6 provides  any explanation  of a 264  GORDON 
slowdown  in the growth rate of the Solow residual. In both cases there is a 
sharp transitory drop in the residual followed by a recovery to the original 
level. During the recovery period the residual rises, i.e.,  grows faster than 
in  the  base  period  prior to  the  shock.  Thus  to be  consistent  with  the 
author's learning simulations  we should have observed a sharp decelera- 
tion of TFP growth  followed  by an acceleration  to a growth  rate substan- 
tially above the pre-shock  (i.e.,  pre-1970) growth rate. No such time path 
has been observed  for the actual behavior of U.S. TFP.  Instead, as shown 
in my Table 1, there was a two-stage  slowdown,  initially during 1972-1979 
and then  a further slowdown  in 1979-1994. 
Several experiments  are conducted  with  a related "mismeasurement" 
model.  In all four experiments  plotted  in Figures 8-11  the "true" Solow 
residual is flat (with a temporary downward  spike in Figure 10), but the 
incorrectly measured  Solow residual exhibits a permanent decline.  While 
the details differ across the experiments,  the essential  cause of the abso- 
lute  decline  in the  residual  is that the effect of technological  change  in 
increasing  capital input is better measured  than the resulting increase in 
output  caused  by that capital input. 
To assess  the  plausibility  of the  mismeasurement  results,  I prefer to 
use  a much  simpler  model  that brings  out  an important  flaw  in HK's 
exercises.  The growth  in output  (Ay) is a weighted  average of growth in 
consumption  (Ac) and  investment  goods  (Ai). Thinking  about a steady 
state  in  which  we  can  neglect  the  distinction  between  the  growth  of 
investment  and capital (Ak), we have the growth of aggregate  output  as 
Ay =  3 Ac +  (1 -  8) Ak.  (1) 
The growth  in consumption  goods  (and services) is equal to the growth 
in the  Solow  residual  in the consumption  section  (Asc)  plus  a weighted 
average  of the growth  in labor and capital inputs.  Assuming  for conve- 
nience that the growth rate of labor input is zero, the production process 
for consumption  goods  is 
Ac = Asc + a Ak.  (2) 
Finally,  the  growth  in  investment  (and  in  capital) is  produced  by  the 
same production  process,  with a different Solow residual (Ask): 
Ask 
Ak =  Ask +  a  Ak =  (3) 
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Table  2  EFFECTS  OF MISMEASUREMENT  IN A SIMPLE  MODELa 
Output  Capital  Residual 
growth  growth  growth 
Ay  Ak  Aa 
1.  Initial  situation  4.00  4.00  2.80 
2.  Accelerate  Ask  to 3.5 
a.  True  value  4.44  5.00  2.94 
b.  Mismeasure  Ak  4.24  4.00  3.04 
c.  Mismeasure  Ac  4.20  5.00  2.66 
a Assumed parameters  a = 0.3, 3 = 0.8, "true"  Asc  = Ask  = 2.8. 
Since labor input is constant,  the aggregate value of the Solow residual 
can  be  calculated  as  Aa =  Ay -  a  Ak. We may  easily  use  this  simple 
structure  to  evaluate  the  HK  proposition  that  mismeasurement  can 
cause  an acceleration  in capital-embodied  technical  progress  to cause  a 
decline  in the Solow  residual.  We begin  in line  1 of my Table 2 with  an 
initial situation  prior to the  technological  acceleration.  The calculations 
take the  share of capital in income  to be a  =  0.3 and the  share of con- 
sumption  in output  to be f  = 0.8. The initial value of the Solow residual 
in both the consumption  and the investment  sector is assumed  to be 2.8, 
and the growth rate of both output and capital is 4.0. Now let us raise the 
Solow  residual  in the investment  sector from 2.8 to 3.5.  The economy's 
true response  is shown  in line 2a, with an acceleration of capital growth 
from 4.0% to  5.0%,  in  output  growth  from 4.0% to 4.44% and  in  the 
aggregate  Solow  residual  from 2.8% to 2.94% (since the share of invest- 
ment in output is 0.2, the aggregate residual accelerates by 0.14, which is 
0.2 times the 0.7 acceleration in the capital goods  sector). 
How  does  mismeasurement  change  this  story?  If mismeasurement 
causes  the  acceleration  in  capital-goods  output  to be missed,  but con- 
sumption  output  (including  the contribution  of capital to consumption) 
is measured  correctly, we  obtain line 2b. The Solow  residual accelerates, 
not the result we  are looking  for. Instead,  we  need  the opposite  type of 
mismeasurement,  in  which  the  output  of  investment  goods  and  the 
input of capital are measured  accurately, but the contribution of the extra 
capital growth  to consumption  growth is entirely missed.  This yields line 
2c, with a deceleration  in the Solow residual from the initial 2.80 in line 1 
to 2.66. 
But here the simple  example  reveals the flaw in HK's exercise.  In line 
2c we  manage  to obtain a deceleration  of the Solow residual, but only in 
a situation  in which  the measured  growth  in capital accelerates.  And this 
is  counterfactual,  as  shown  in  Table 1.  Since  the  growth  rate  of  the 266  - GORDON 
capital-labor  ratio can be calculated  as (Ay -  An -  Aa)la, it appears that 
growth in capital decelerated from 4.0% to 2.9% per year in the total 
private economy between 1950-1972 and 1972-1994, and from 3.2% to 
2.1% per year in the NFNM sector. While, as pointed out above, the 
growth of the capital-labor ratio did accelerate in the manufacturing 
sector, this is of no help to the authors, since what they are trying to 
explain in this paper is the productivity-growth  slowdown outside of 
manufacturing. 
A further  problem is that there is no connection  between the theoreti- 
cal exercise and the data section. Have the sectors exhibiting  the largest 
TFP growth slowdowns been those experiencing the greatest accelera- 
tion in capital  quality?  In some sectors, particularly  communications  (not 
shown separately in HK's Table  2), capital quality,  output growth, and 
the Solow residual have all accelerated.  Perhaps the leading candidate 
for capital acceleration  and a Solow residual slowdown is financial  ser- 
vices, where there has been a massive investment in computers but 
where the payoff in terms of higher transactions  volume and improved 
quality has been almost entirely missed in official  output measurement. 
4.  An Alternative  Explanation:  The  Slowdown  is Real 
As we have seen, there  is scant  if any evidence of a technological  accelera- 
tion, and it is impossible to concoct a model scenario in which such an 
acceleration  causes a TFP  slowdown without also causing  a counterfactual 
acceleration  in the growth rate of measured capital. There  is little if any 
evidence available  that the measurement  of consumption-goods  output is 
much worse than capital-goods  output, as is required  by HK's mismea- 
surement hypothesis. HK's  exercises  are inconsistent  with the basic facts 
of the productivity  slowdown, which are that the growth rates of output 
per hour, of capital  per hour, and of the Solow residual  all slowed down 
and by about the same amount, and that the same pattern is observed 
across all countries. Surely mismeasurement  is important  whether there 
has been a technological  acceleration  or not, and the combination  of a shift 
in output toward the poorly measured part  of the economy, plus the CPI 
"formula  bias," may explain part of the slowdown. 
But much of the rest of the slowdown may be real. It is quite possible 
that the great invention of the last part of this century, the electronic 
computer, does not have the potential to achieve a massive increase in 
TFP as did earlier inventions. It is a stylized fact that TFP growth re- 
mained at or below 0.5%  per annum during nineteenth century,  acceler- 
ated to 1.5%  between 1915 and 1965, and then has decelerated  back to 
0.5% or below since the late 1970s. The "one big wave" of American Comment 267 
economic  growth  during  1915-1965  reflects  the  combined  influence  of 
several  central inventions  that,  taken  together,  had  a much  more  pro- 
found impact on the way the economy  and society operated than has the 
electronic  computer.  These  great inventions  of the early twentieth  cen- 
tury include: 
the pervasive  spread of electric motors and appliances  into all aspects of 
production  and consumption, 
the  use  of  the  internal  combustion  engine  in  motor  transport  and  air 
transport, with the derivative inventions  of the suburb, interstate high- 
way, and supermarket, 
the  confluence  of oil refining,  chemicals,  and plastics and their deriva- 
tives, 
the telephone  and its derivatives,  and 
the range of entertainment  and information industries,  including  radio, 
movies,  television,  and recorded music. 
Part of  the  reason  that  electronic  computers  have  thus  far failed  to 
produce  a TFP revolution  is that they still represent a very small fraction 
of the capital stock (especially  when  structures are included  as capital). 
But there is an additional  sense  in which  computers  are not as "impor- 
tant" as our list of early twentieth  century inventions.  While retrospec- 
tive  exercises  are inevitably  subjective,  it is helpful  to ask oneself,  did 
America's  "true" standard  of living  change  as much between  1955 and 
1995 as it did between  1915 and 1955, or between  1875 and 1915? There 
are plenty  of television  reruns and magazine  advertisements  that allow 
us  to  relive  life  in  1955,  and  my  feeling  is  that  it  does  not  differ  as 
radically from our present  conditions  as life in 1915 differed from that in 
1955. 
In many  senses  we  are sliding  down  a curve of diminishing  returns: 
the transition from LPs to CDs is not as big a deal as going from nothing 
to records,  just as the transition from movies  in the theater to movies  at 
home  on the VCR is not as big a deal as going  from nothing  to movies. 
Word processing  on a Pentium computer with Windows  95 compared to 
a decade-ago  IBM 286 represents  a smaller transition than the inventions 
of the personal computer  or the invention  of the typewriter. As amazing 
as it may seem,  we  somehow  managed  to win World War II when  only 
typewriters,  not  computers,  were  available to keep  track of 12 million 
people  in the armed forces. While my interpretation may seem  gloomy, 
it seems  to be  supported  by  the  marked  slowdown  in TFP growth  in 
recent years in Japan, Germany, and other countries,  as they converge  to 
the American  technological  frontier. 268 * RAMEY 
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1. Introduction 
This paper  offers a provocative  new  explanation  for the measured  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown  that began  in the  early 1970s. In contrast to other 
explanations,  which  emphasize  negative economic  shocks,  this  paper 
presents  the  case  for  a positive economic  shock  as  the  source  of  the 
productivity  slowdown.  The idea is quite radical: increases  in the rate of 
investment-specific  technological  progress  can manifest  themselves  as 
prolonged  periods  of diminished economic  performance.  To derive  this 
result,  Hornstein  and  Krusell  emphasize  two  aspects  of  investment- 
specific  technological  progress.  First, adoption  of  new  technology  re- 
quires time to learn, resulting in temporarily lower productivity. Second, 
technological  change  increases  the quality of goods  in a way that is very 
difficult  to  measure.  The  result  is  measurements  that understate  true 
productivity  growth. 
Hornstein  and Krusell's hypothesis  represents  a Panglossian  view  of 
the  world.  If their explanation  is correct, the negative  welfare  implica- 
tions  associated  with  many  standard  theories  are completely  reversed. 
Building  the case for such a counterintuitive  idea is difficult, but Horn- 
stein and Krusell rise to the occasion.  The paper builds,  piece by piece, 
an  accumulation  of  evidence  that is  consistent  with  their hypothesis. 
The  result  is  a very  interesting  and  novel  paper  that deserves  serious 
attention. 
The rest of my discussion  will consist of three parts. I will first discuss 
the intuition  of the hypothesis  in the form of an analogy and then briefly 
review  their evidence  in favor of the hypothesis.  Second,  I will discuss 
other  implications  of  the  hypothesis,  and  show  that  they  are not  so 
favorable to the hypothesis.  Finally, I will add some concluding  remarks. 
2. Intuition  and  Evidence  for the  Hypothesis 
Anyone  who  has  recently  changed  word-processing  packages  should 
find Hornstein  and Krusell's arguments  to be plausible.  Changing  word 
processors  typically  results in temporary decreases  in true productivity. 
Simple tasks such as pagination  and typing mathematical formulas sud- 
denly  become  difficult.  Adoption  of  the  new  technology  temporarily Comments  269 
decreases  one's knowledge  level,  and requires effort in learning the new 
technology.  Furthermore,  standard  measurements  of output  might  not 
indicate  any  gain  associated  with  adoption.  A government  statistician 
who  measured  output  by page  counts  would  not measure  any change. 
Yet the  quality of  output  has  risen: the  tables  and  equations  are more 
readable  and  there  might  be  increased  compatibility  with  coauthors. 
Hornstein  and  Krusell argue  that this  experience  is an important  eco- 
nomic phenomenon. 
In support  of their argument,  Hornstein  and Krusell present  four key 
pieces  of evidence.  I will briefly discuss  each of these. 
1.  The growth slowdown occurred  in most developed  countries. Explanations 
for the  productivity  slowdown  that are specific to the United  States 
are less  compelling  because  the  slowdown  was  indeed  an interna- 
tional  phenomenon.  Hornstein  and  Krusell's hypothesis  passes  the 
international  test  because  technological  progress  tends  to  diffuse 
across developed  countries.  Thus,  any increase in the rate of invest- 
ment-specific  technological  progress  should  have  been  experienced 
internationally. 
2.  The rate of decline of relative prices of producers'  durable  goods increased  in 
the early to mid 1970s. Figure 2 of the  paper  and  the  accompanying 
regression  show  that Gordon's  measure  of the relative price of dura- 
ble goods  declines  more steeply  after the early 1970s. If this decline is 
associated  with  an increase  in the rate of technological  progress  (an 
interpretation  that I will  question  later), then  the  data suggest  that 
the timing is correct. 
3.  The calibrated  model  produces  slowdowns in measured  productivity  growth. 
Both  the  learning  effects  and  hypothesized  quality  measurement 
problems  lead  to  simulated  productivity  slowdowns.  To obtain  de- 
creases  in output growth, however,  the  model  requires either  a very 
large compatibility  problem  or an exogenous  increase  in the quality 
content  of output.  The key parameters underlying  both of these  fea- 
tures  are difficult  to  observe  in practice.  Hornstein  and  Krusell are 
only  able  to  offer  some  suggestive  evidence  on  the  qualitative,  but 
not quantitative,  values  of the parameters. 
4.  Total  factor productivity  growth recovered  almost completely  in the measur- 
able  sector  after  1979. Hornstein  and Krusell show  that the productivity 
slowdown  in  the  sectors  in  which  quality  mismeasurement  is  less 
problematic  was  indeed  temporary. This fact is consistent  with  their 
hypothesis  on learning leading  to temporary slowdowns  in true pro- 
ductivity  growth,  and  mismeasurement  leading  to prolonged  slow- 
downs  in measured  productivity  growth. 270 *  RAMEY 
3.  Some  Opposing  Evidence 
While  Horstein  and  Krusell's  evidence  favors  their  hypothesis,  it 
should  be noted  that they have explored only a small subset of its poten- 
tial implications.  In this  section,  I will  argue that there are other direct 
implications  of the theory. I will then show  that the data are not consis- 
tent with  these  implications,  or with Hornstein  and Krusell's interpreta- 
tion of the underlying  facts. Instead,  the data on which  I focus are more 
consistent  with  standard  explanations  for the  productivity  slowdown 
that focus on negative  economic  events. 
In the  spirit of the  standard  growth  accounting  literature, Hornstein 
and  Krusell analyze  only  production  functions,  and do not  specify  the 
optimizing  problem  underlying  technology  adoption  or the  rest of the 
features  of  the  general  equilibrium  economy.  Conducting  a complete 
analysis  of  a  fully  specified  general  equilibrium  model  is,  of  course, 
very  difficult.  Some  of the  general  equilibrium  principles  and  implica- 
tions  of  technological  change  and  quality  mismeasurement,  however, 
are quite intuitive,  and I will focus on these  elements. 
I begin by emphasizing  two principles about technological  change and 
one about quality mismeasurement.  None  of these  should  be controver- 
sial. First, an increase in the rate of technological  change implies that the 
economy's  production  possibilities  frontier is expanding  at a faster rate. 
Thus,  an increase in technological  change  cannot make agents worse  off 
in present-value  terms. Second,  firms are not forced  to adopt new technol- 
ogy;  instead,  they  can make  an optimizing  choice.  A firm should  only 
invest  in  new  technology  if the  expected  present  discounted  value  of 
future profits outweighs  current losses  due to learning. The third princi- 
ple regards quality mismeasurement.  True increases in quality, although 
difficult for economists  to measure,  must be perceived by individuals,  or 
else  they  are not actual increases  in quality. (The only exceptions  to this 
principle are "postexperience  goods,"  such as drugs, whose  true quality 
may not be perceived  even  with consumption.) 
These three principles  imply that even  in a world with learning effects 
and  difficulties  in measuring  quality, indices  of economic  performance 
that  summarize  individuals'  information  should  accurately  reflect  the 
net positive  impact of technological  change.  One such index is the stock- 
market value  of firms. Although  economists  cannot accurately measure 
increases  in production  opportunities  or increases in quality, firms, con- 
sumers,  and  shareholders  should  perceive  these  changes.  If a positive 
shock  to  the  growth  rate of  technology  was  an  important  part of  the 
economic  events  of  the  1970s,  then  the  stock  market should  have  re- 
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Figure  1 LOG  REAL  STOCK  PRICE  (VALUE-WEIGHTED  CRSP  INDEX, 
DIVIDENDS  INCLUDED) 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1.85197 -  1.B5197  ~~-  Average Real RetJrns 
1954-73  1973-79  1979-93 
9.2  %  -2.1  %  10.9  % 
-.47363  - 
55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90 
year 
Figure 1 shows  the behavior  of the log of real stock prices (with divi- 
dends)  from 1954 to 1993, as well as the average real returns. The CPI was 
used  to deflate  nominal  prices; alternative indices  led to similar results. 
The graph clearly shows  that agents perceived  the net effect of shocks in 
the early 1970s to be negative:  the stock market fell during the 1970s, and 
real returns were negative from 1973 to 1979. Note that short-run learning 
effects  cannot  be  invoked  as  an  explanation,  because  the  stock  price 
should  reflect the present  discounted  value of the effects of technological 
change.  Furthermore, arguing that the oil shocks can explain the decline 
in the stock market supports  the notion  that the productivity  slowdown 
was  more likely  due  to negative  economic  shocks  than to positive  eco- 
nomic shocks.  Finally, while one might try to explain an individual  firm's 
decline  in  stock  price  with  the  argument  of  capital losses  on  existing 
equipment,  the first principle I set out above suggests  that this argument 
cannot explain an aggregate  decline in the value of firms. 
The evidence  from stock prices does  not refute the possibility  that the 
rate of technological  change increased in the early 1970s. It does suggest, 
however,  that the negative  shocks  during  this period  were  much  more 
important than any positive  shocks.  Thus, the stock price evidence  sup- 272 *  RAMEY 
Figure  2 CORPORATE-PROFITS-GDP  RATIO,  NONELECTRICAL 
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ports "negative shock," rather than "positive shock," explanations  of the 
productivity  slowdown. 
I will suggest  further that even  the evidence  for an increase in the rate 
of investment-specific  technological  change  in the  early 1970s is weak. 
The only  evidence  presented  by Hornstein  and Krusell in this regard is 
the decline in the relative price of producers' durable goods.  If the source 
of this  decline  in relative  prices is high  relative productivity  growth  in 
producers'  durable  goods  industries,  then  relative profit rates in these 
industries  should  have  risen  (or at  least  not  fallen).  It is  difficult  to 
imagine  a scenario  in which  technological  growth  would  lower  relative 
profit rates. Yet relative profit rates of equipment  producers fell. Figure 2 
shows  relative  profit  rates  for  nonelectrical  machinery  (SIC 35),  con- 
structed  using  data  on  corporate  profits  and  GDP  from  the  Economic 
Report  of the President. This industry  represents  an important fraction of 
equipment  manufacturing.  Relative profits show  downward  trends from 
the  mid-1960s  to  the  early  1980s.  The  same  is  true for durable  goods 
overall. These trends are at odds with the notion of high relative techno- 
logical progress  in producers'  durable goods. 
If not  technological  progress,  then  what  caused  the relative  price of Comments  273 
producers'  durable goods  to fall over this period? One possible  explana- 
tion is a decline  in markups.  Many of these  industries  have historically 
been  characterized  by  firms  with  market  power  and  high  rents.  For 
example,  the  four-firm  concentration  ratio for turbines  (SIC 3511) was 
90% in 1972. One  force that could have led to an erosion  of that market 
power  and  a decline  in markups  is the rise of import competition.  The 
import  share  of  the  domestic  market  for nonelectrical  machinery  rose 
from 3% in 1965 to 10.6% in 1980. Another  possible  explanation  is that 
firms in these  industries  compete  through  quality improvements  rather 
than through  price.  This strategy  could  explain both the increased  em- 
phasis  on quality and the decline  in the quality-adjusted  price over this 
period.  Thus,  there is an alternative story that explains some  of the facts 
highlighted  by the authors.  Completely  independently  of the source of 
the productivity  slowdown,  markups on producers'  durable goods  fell, 
leading  to downward  trends in relative prices and increased investment 
in equipment. 
4.  Concluding  Remarks 
Based on the evidence  reviewed  in the previous  section,  I am skeptical of 
the  potential  for  increased  rates  of  investment-specific  technological 
change  to explain the slowdown  in both output and productivity growth 
that  began  in  the  early  1970s.  The  decline  in  relative  profit  rates  in 
producers'  durable goods  calls into  question  the interpretation  of price 
declines  as evidence  of technological  change.  The poor performance  of 
the  stock  market  in  the  1970s  supports  a  negative-shock  rather than 
positive-shock  explanation  of the productivity  slowdown. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  evidence  is more  favorable if one  shifts  the 
timing  to explaining  events  of the 1980s and 1990s. As shown  in Figure 
1, stock-market returns were high during the period 1979-1993.  Further- 
more,  despite  heavy  import  competition,  relative  profit  rates  in  pro- 
ducer's  durable goods  began  to rise in the early 1980s. Thus,  Hornstein 
and Krusell's evidence  as well as these  series shows  patterns consistent 
with  an increase  in investment-specific  technological  change  beginning 
in  the  1980s.  The  recovery  of  productivity  growth  in  the  measurable 
sector during  this  period  suggests  that the negative  impact of learning 
effects was  small. 
In sum,  Hornstein  and Krusell have presented  a very interesting  eco- 
nomic theory that links increased rates of investment-specific  technologi- 
cal progress with productivity  slowdowns.  While the link exists in theory, 
the evidence  does not support its application to the 1970s slowdown.  The 
evidence  is more favorable for several aspects of the hypothesis,  such as 274 - DISCUSSION 
increased  technological  progress and mismeasurement  problems,  if they 
are used  to explain growth  during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Discussion 
The authors  began  the  discussion  by replying  to some  issues  raised in 
the formal comments.  Per Krusell agreed that it was difficult to pin down 
the size and timing of the hypothesized  increase in the rate of technologi- 
cal progress;  but  he  felt  that  the  weight  of  the  numbers  presented  in 
their paper was in favor of such an increase having occurred. One inter- 
esting  direction,  Krusell suggested,  would  be to assess  the sensitivity  of 
the finding  of increased  technical progress to the choice of break date, in 
particular, to consider break dates later than 1973. Krusell also defended 
their model  of quality  change,  in which  the  "share" of quality in final 
output  is  exogenous,  as  a  reasonable  approximation  to  a  more  fully 
specified  model  with  endogenous  quality  change.  He  agreed  that the 
development  of  endogenous-quality  models,  which  might  well  look 
something  like  recent  endogenous-growth  models,  was  a worthwhile 
direction  for research.  Andreas  Hornstein  suggested  that, while  it was 
important to model the technology  adoption choice in an explicit optimiz- 
ing  framework,  the  models  studied  in  their  paper  provided  a useful 
starting point for assessing  the effects of increased technical progress on 
measured  productivity.  He also argued that their assumption  that new- 
technology  adoption  has a large negative initial impact on productivity is 
not inconsistent  with  evidence  from the growth  and learning-by-doing 
literatures. 
There  was  some  discussion  of  Valerie Ramey's  argument,  that  the 
poor  stock-market  performance  of the  1970s seemed  inconsistent  with 
the  premise  of  an  increased  rate of  technological  change  during  that 
decade.  Ben Bernanke  pointed  out  that the  decade  after 1973 included 
two  oil  shocks  and  two  serious  recessions,  which  might  explain  low 
returns  to  stocks  despite  underlying  improvement  in  technology.  He 
noted  that more recently  price-earnings  ratios in the stock market have 
risen significantly. 
Sam Kortum elaborated on Bob Gordon's suggestion,  that the produc- 
tivity  slowdown  was  in  fact  a  return  to  "normal" rates  of  technical 
progress,  following  an  era that was  truly exceptional  in  terms  of eco- 
nomically  important  new  technologies.  He pointed  out that this thesis, 
plus  the  assumption  that innovations  gradually  diffuse,  could  account 
for the worldwide  nature of the slowdown;  it could also account for the 
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more  severe  slowdown  experienced  by industrial  countries  other  than 
the  United  States,  which,  having  reached  the  technological  frontier, 
could  no  longer  enjoy  the  "catch-up"  productivity  growth  bonus  of 
technological  followers.  Gordon  cited  evidence  that  the  U.S.  output- 
capital  ratio  is  declining  as  support  for the  view  that  diminishing  re- 
turns  to factors have  begun  to overwhelm  technological  improvement, 
as well  as for the position  that the productivity  slowdown  has occurred 
outside  the investment  sector. 
Julio Rotemberg  raised the puzzle  that there has been  a lot of invest- 
ment  in computers  even  though  the measured  returns on these  invest- 
ments  have  been  very  low.  He  thought  that  this  might  actually  be 
consistent  with the authors' argument,  because these low rates of return 
could be due to learning.  Moreover, rational firms might be investing  in 
spite  of  these  low  rates  of return because  they  expect  high  returns  to 
accrue  in  the  future.  Krusell  questioned  standard  growth  accounting 
exercises  that conclude  that, because  the  share of information  technol- 
ogy  in investment  is relatively low and the measured  returns small, the 
new  technologies  cannot be having  an important effect on productivity. 
He argued that electronic devices  are becoming  ubiquitous and affect the 
productivity,  both measured  and unmeasured,  of many forms of capital, 
especially  equipment. 